Sumter to Appomattox







American Civil War Round Table of Australia (New South Wales Chapter)www.americancivilwar.asn.auPatron: Prof the Hon Bob Carr

President's Message

Dear Round Table members,

If anyone had previously said that I would one day be a card-carrying member of a rugby league club, I would have laughed them out of the room. But here I am: a card-carrying member of Magpies at Waitara. Please do not tell any of my friends. They would be aghast at such a move being inconsistent with my previous 72 years.

Thank you to Dan Howard and Bruce McLennan for having great fun methodically checking out the various possible venues for our meetings after the Roseville Club closed for rebuilding work. Many had problems - too expensive; no restaurant; too run-down; noisy; gambling dens; parking difficult, WH&S issues. Magpies won.

The new venue needed to be near a railway station, have adequate parking, a good food service, and possess suitable facilities for us.

Magpies ticked all these boxes and was the only one to do so. I am sorry that it means a little extra train time for some of you, but I am pleased that it is just across the street from Waitara railway station and has parking underneath. It is even closer than what you have been used to.

I hope you like it. I am interested in knowing what you think of it, but not until AFTER the meeting on 16 April. When you enter the club, bear slightly to the left to find the meeting room. Never fear, we will send out a search party to find any members who have ended up in the wrong part of the club. That is possible as it is rather larger than the Roseville Club was.

I hope to see you there on 16 April.

.....Ian McIntyre

Number 123 Feb. – March 2024

Our Next Meeting

Tuesday 16th April

At our new venue:

The Waitara Magpies Club

11 Alexandria Pde. - directly opposite Waitara Station (see below). There is parking around the station and underneath the Club.

Oder bistro meal well beforehand – round tables in Magpie Room. Meeting starts at 7.00pm.

Topics -

General Fremont – Bob Carr **The Seven Days** – John Morrison **Surprise topic**. – Tom Dixen



As usual, we are keen to hear from our membership so if you have a particular subject, please get in touch with Program Director John Morrison.

On our **Website** you will always find the date of our next meeting. Our Facebook page is also www.americancivilwar.asn.au

Our Last Meeting

John Morrison began the meeting by welcoming members and guests and spoke of the success of our last function, the Christmas event. Returning to the year 1862, he then introduced the topics of this meeting – two battles, both disappointing for the Union, which took place in 1862 in the East.

The purpose of the Overland Campaign was to move against the Confederate Capital, Richmond, because it was a logistical, communication and governmental hub, one of the few industrial hubs that the Confederacy had. This was a Campaign that made sense. This Campaign heavily features General MacLellan and, as Tony K had given an excellent presentation on him at our August 2023 meeting, he was invited to give a followup presentation on The Peninsula Campaign.

Before this, John spoke about dovetailing this battle with the Jackson Valley Campaign. This was the battle that 'made' General 'Stonewall' Jackson. He became the most famous Confederate General at this point.

John also referred to the fact that these two battles are still studied at Military Academies. In Australia, General John Monash studied the Valley Campaign and admired General Jackson. Also, apparently, General Heinz Guderian, father of Blitzkrieg, studied Jackson's campaigns.



The Peninsula Campaign: Hampton Roads to Seven Pines March-July 1862

Tony Kovacevic

Tony began by acknowledging John's assistance in preparing for the presentation.

George Brinton McClellan, "Little Mac", fresh from his victorious campaign in western Virginia, radiated success and quickly transformed the demoralized Army of the Potomac into the most powerful army ever witnessed in America - providing his troops with the best training, armaments and organization then known and replacing Winfield Scott as Union General-in-Chief. But by late 1861, he had given no indication of how or when he might strike against the Confederate army – leading President Lincoln to ask, "If General McClellan does not intend to use his army, may I borrow it?". McClellan's response would set in motion one of the war's most pivotal events – the Peninsula Campaign.



Gen. Joseph E. Johnson CSA; Gen. George B. McClellan USA; Gen. Robert E. Lee CSA

Gen. McClellan believed that Richmond held the fate of the Confederacy, yet he eschewed the notion of marching overland toward the Confederate capital. This, he argued, would enable the Confederates to use interior lines to develop a defensive concentration, inflicting severe casualties. Instead, he proposed an indirect strategic movement – to interdict his army between the Confederate forces in Virginia by way of Urbanna on the Rappahannock River. Before McClellan could put his plan into motion, General Joseph E. Johnston pulled his army from Manassas to Fredericksburg – thus invalidating this plan.

The Plan

- Virginia Peninsula York-James Peninsula one of two major approaches to the Confederate capital at Richmond (Benjamin Butler attempted to advance against Richmond - defeat at Battle of Big Bethel, 10 June 1861. But did secure Fort Monroe and Camp Butler on Newport News Point).
- Fort Monroe the only fort in the Upper South not to fall into Confederate hands. Commanded the entrance to Hampton Roads. Even though the Confederates maintained control of Norfolk and Gosport Navy Yard, Fort Monroe became a major base for Federal fleet and army operations.
- With Joe Johnston's retreat ruining the Urbanna Plan's, McClellan thought that by "using Fort Monroe as a base," the Army of the Potomac could march against Richmond "with complete security, altho' with less celebrity and brilliancy of results, up the Peninsula."
- A sound strategic concept employed a shrewd exploitation of Union naval superiority, since gunboats could protect flanks and river steamers could carry troops toward the Confederate capital.

McClellan offered a second amphibious operation to strike at Richmond by way of the Virginia Peninsula, which had been recognized from the war's onset as strategically important. Bordered by Hampton Roads and Chesapeake Bay as well as the James and York Rivers, it was one of two major approaches to Richmond. General Ben Butler's attempt to exploit this avenue of advance was defeated during the Battle of Big Bethel in June 1861, but his actions did secure Fort Monroe and Camp Butler on Newport News Point. Fort Monroe was the only fort in the Upper South not to fall into Confederate hands. It commanded the entrance to Hampton Roads and, even though the Confederates maintained control of Norfolk and Gosport Navy Yard, it rapidly became a major base for Federal fleet and army operations. McClellan believed that by "using Fort Monroe as a base" the Army of the Potomac could march against Richmond "with complete security, altho' with less celebrity and brilliancy of results, up the Peninsula". It was a sound strategic concept, employing a shrewd exploitation of Union naval superiority since gunboats could protect his flanks and river steamers could carry his troops toward Richmond.

McClellan shared the merits of his plan with Lincoln and strove to allay the President's fears for the defence of Washington, but his campaign started to unhinge with the emergence of the powerful ironclad ram C.S.S. Virginia in March 1862. The Virginia was converted from the U.S.S. Merrimack, scuttled when the Federal forces evacuated Norfolk in 1861. In one day, Virginia destroyed two Union warships and threatened Federal control of Hampton Roads. Lincoln viewed these events as the greatest Union calamity since Bull Run; Secretary of War Edwin Stanton feared Virginia would attack the Federal capital, but the next day, the Southern ironclad was fought by the revolutionary U.S.S Monitor to a standstill at the Battle of Hampton Roads. Although the Virginia was unable to destroy the Union fleet, her presence blocking the James River would continue to delay and alter McClellan's campaign.

Nevertheless, McClellan, confident that *Monitor* could hold off any advance by the *Virginia* against his transports, proceeded with his campaign. He began shipping his 121,500-strong army with supplies and armaments to Fort Monroe on 17 March 1862, intending to move against Richmond by way of the York River. This was the largest amphibious operation in North America; indeed, The Army of the Potomac was bigger than any city in Virginia!

Opposing Forces

Union Forces	Confederate forces
Commander	Commander
Maj Gen George B McLellan	Gen Joseph E Johnston
Forces	Forces
121,000	69,000
 II Corps - Brig. Gen. Edwin V. Sumner 	 Left Wing - Maj. Gen. D. H. H Center Wing - Maj. Gen. Jam
 III Corps - Brig. Gen. Samuel P. Heintzelman 	Longstreet Right Wing - Maj. Gen. John 1
• IV Corps - Brig. Gen. Erasmus D. Keyes	Magruder* (11,000 - only force McLellan in early stages)

Confederate prospects looked bleak with McClellan moving to the Peninsula. General Ambrose Burnside's troops were finalizing their conquest of eastern North Carolina and Union forces under Grant appeared invincible along the Mississippi River. Southerners feared that if Richmond were to fall, the Confederacy might collapse. Their hopes were pinned on the *C.S.S. Virginia* holding Hampton Roads, and General John Bankhead Magruder's small 'Army of the Peninsula' delaying the Union advance toward Richmond.

On 4 April, McClellan's army began its march up the Peninsula, occupying abandoned Confederate works at Big Bethel and Young's Mill. The next day, they were slowed by heavy rains, which turned the already poor roads into a quagmire. They were then blocked by Magruder's command entrenched along a 12mile front. 'Prince John' Magruder, despite being heavily outnumbered, created an illusion of a powerful army and "played his ten thousand before McClellan like fireflies," wrote diarist Mary Chesnut, "and utterly deluded him". The Union army halted in its tracks.

McLennan's campaign then completely changed in response to four factors:

i. his plans for a rapid movement past Yorktown being upset by the unexpected Confederate defences,

ii. Lincoln's decision not to release Irwin McDowell's Corps for his use in a flanking movement against the Southern fortifications at Gloucester Point,

iii. the U. S. Navy's refusal to support McClellan's advance due to fears that *Virginia* might attack the Union fleet while they attempted to silence the Confederate guns at Yorktown and Gloucester Point, and

iv. reconnaissance (provided by detective Alan Pinkerton and Professor Thaddeus Lowe's balloons) confirming his belief that he was outnumbered by the Confederates.

McClellan's campaign completely changed, and he thus besieged their defences.

As McClellan's men constructed emplacements for their siege guns, Confederate General Joe Johnston began moving his entire army to the lower Peninsula. Johnston thought his position was weak, noting that, "no one but McClellan could have hesitated to attack."

McClellan's men did attempt to break the Confederate line, but the poorly coordinated and supported assaults on 16 April failed to break the Confederate weak point. The siege continued for another two weeks even though

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Johnston counselled retreat, arguing that "the fight for Yorktown must be one of artillery, in which we cannot win. The result is certain; the time only doubtful". Finally, on 3 May – just as McClellan made his last preparations to unleash a heavy bombardment – Johnston abandoned the fortifications.

Battle of Williamsburg

Surprised by the Confederate withdrawal, McClellan attempted to cut off Johnston's retreat, ordering General Edwin "Bull" Sumner to attack the Confederate rearguard. The result was the bloody, indecisive 5 May Battle of Williamsburg, fought along the Williamsburg Line, a series of 14 redoubts built between Queens and College creeks. Fighting raged all day, with the Confederates repelling the first Union assaults and then pressing the Federals back down the Hampton Road.

By mid-afternoon, the Union lines were in disarray when General Philip Kearny personally led a charge that stabilized the Union lines. General Winfield Scott Hancock's flanking move, into several unmanned redoubts on the Confederate left, then forced the Confederates to abandon the Williamsburg Line.

McClellan called the Battle of Williamsburg "an accident caused by too rapid a pursuit", but it was an opportunity to destroy Johnston's army before it could reach the Confederate capital. However, success slipped away as the Union victory was marred by the McClellan's inability to aggressively take advantage of tactical opportunities available due to the Confederate retreat.


McClellan did not arrive on the Williamsburg battlefield until dark, when the engagement was ending, having been in Yorktown supervising the embarkation of General William Franklin's move up the York River which threatened to block Johnston's withdrawal to Richmond. However, although able to secure a beachhead on 6 May, Franklin's timid move inland next day was halted by Confederate forces under William C. H. Whiting and John Bell Hood.

Disenchanted with McClellan's general lack of initiative, Lincoln arrived at Fort Monroe on 6 May. With the Confederate army now in retreat toward Richmond, Lincoln sought to open the James River to the Union's use - the only obstacle being the CSS *Virginia*.

The Confederate retreat from the lower Peninsula exposed the port city of Norfolk to Union capture. Lincoln directed Flag Officer Louis Goldsborough and General John E. Wool to end *Virginia's* control of Hampton Roads by occupying its base. General Benjamin Huger, threatened by the Union advance, abandoned the port city on 9 May. Without its base, the *Virginia* was unable to steam up the James River to Richmond and was destroyed by her crew off Craney Island on 11 May. The door to the Confederate capital via the James River now lay open and a Union fleet, including the ironclads *Galena* and *Monitor*, moved slowly up the river to within seven miles of Richmond. On 15 May, hastily-constructed Confederate batteries atop Drewry's Bluff repelled the Union naval advance.

Despite this repulse, by the end of May, McClellan's army neared the outskirts of the Confederate capital. McClellan had established a major supply base near West Point and appeared ready to invest Richmond with his siege artillery.

However, his delays on the lower Peninsula once again altered his plans. General Thomas 'Stonewall' Jackson's operations in the Shenandoah Valley threatened Washington, prompting Lincoln to continue to withhold McDowell's Corps at Fredericksburg. McClellan, extending his right flank to meet the expected reinforcements, found his army divided by the swampy Chickahominy River.



Peninsula Campaign – map of events up to the Battle of Seven Pines

Seven Pines/Fair Oaks

Three army corps were north of the Chickahominy River, and two were south (during the spring, the river was known to swell with floodwaters, and the Confederates had destroyed most of the bridges in front of their lines). South of the river, Confederates outnumbered Union forces two to one. Seizing the initiative, Johnston planned to overwhelm the IV Corps under Gen. Erasmus Keyes and the III Corps, led by Gen. Samuel Heintzelman, who were isolated south of the river.

Seven Pines/Fair Oaks

- End of May, McClellan deployed his army of 105,000 men outside Richmond and moved his supply base forward to White House Landing.
- His army dangerously straddled the Chickahominy River, which ran roughly down the center of the peninsula. Three army corps were north of the river, and two were south of it.
 - During spring, the river swelled with floodwaters. Confederates had destroyed most of the bridges in front of their lines.
 - South of the river, Confederates outnumbered Union forces two to one. Seizing the initiative, Johnston planned to overwhelm the isolated IV Corps under Gen. Erasmus Keyes and the III Corps led by Gen. Samuel P. Heintzelman.

The Battle of Seven Pines began late on 31 May and the Confederates succeeded in driving Keyes' IV Corps back, inflicting heavy casualties. Timely reinforcements arrived from Heintzelman's corps to support Keyes and hold the Union left. A mile north of Seven Pines, the Confederate division of Gen. William Whiting attacked the Federal right flank near Fair Oaks Station on the Richmond & York Railroad. The Union line stabilized when Gen. Edwin Sumner's II Corps reinforcements crossed the Chickahominy over Grapevine Bridge. Johnston was wounded and command passed to Gen. Gustavus Smith.

Early on 1 June, the Confederates renewed their assaults against the Federals, who had brought up more reinforcements. Two Confederate brigades attacked Gen. Israel Richardson's II Corps division posted along the railroad. While fighting there, Gen. Oliver O. Howard's was seriously injured, and his right arm was amputated. Howard was out of action for several months. Gen. Joseph Hooker's III Corps division attacked as the Confederates withdrew, ending the two days of fighting.

The battle of Seven Pines was tactically inconclusive and both sides claimed victory. There were two strategic effects. First, after Johnston was wounded, he was replaced by the more aggressive General Robert E. Lee, who would lead this Army of Northern Virginia to many victories in the war. Second, General McClellan chose to abandon his offensive operations to lay siege and await the reinforcements he had requested from President Lincoln; consequently, he never regained strategic momentum.

Battle of Seven Pines - Casualties

Union Forc	es	Confederate fo	orces
Killed	790	Killed	980
Wounded	3594	Wounded	4749
Captured/MIA	1047	Captured/MIA	405
TOTAL	5,431	TOTAL	6,134

Tony's presentation was very well-received, and John complimented him on one of the most comprehensive overviews of the Campaign he had heard.

John then introduced Peter Zacharatos and said how much he was looking forward to his take on Stonewall Jackson's Valley Campaign.

The Jackson Valley Campaign

Peter Zacharatos



Peter began with a preview to what was about to happen in early 1862.

In the Spring of 1862, a pall hung over the Confederacy. Across the nation, Northern armies were on the march, driving Confederate forces from Kentucky, Tennessee, and Missouri. In the East, Union forces seized important footholds along the Atlantic seaboard, and in the South, Union gunboats blasted their way into New Orleans. The young Southern nation stood on the brink of collapse.

To end to the Confederacy once and for all, the North put together a huge army to drive south to capture Richmond, Major General McClellan with over 100,000 troops conducted an amphibious landing, while Major general McDowell with 40,000 troops would advance from the North to conduct a pincer movement on Richmond.

To assist McClellan's Peninsula campaign, the Union sent Major General Nathaniel Banks, a Politician General with over 30,000 troops to the Shenandoah Valley. The Shenandoah Valley was nicknamed the 'Breadbasket of the Confederacy' for being a major granary for the South and providing the majority of the foodstuffs for the Confederate cause. As such, the region is strategically important to the Confederate War effort.

Besides being a valuable breadbasket, the Shenandoah Valley was also a key overland route for rebel armies to outflank Washington DC in its undefended rear. The Valley is shaped is like a knife pointed directly towards the North, as some put it.



The Valley is bordered by the Massanutten Mountains in the south-east and the Allegheny Mountains in the west; it stretches in a northeastern direction, starting from Southern Virginia and the city of Roanoke, all the way up to Winchester in the North. Both sides quickly recognised the region's significance and knew that its control would win or lose the war in the East. Indeed, the town of Winchester would change hands 72 times throughout the war.

President Lincoln wanted his capital safe from any threat during McClellan's grand campaign, so Banks' mission was to clear the Valley and, once he was done, to send men over the Blue Ridge Mountains to help and aid the main effort Union at Richmond.




Despite McClellan having a clear superiority in numbers, one of his big faults – as Tony has put it – other than being overly cautious, was that he constantly kept overestimating the enemy's strength. For this reason, he thought it was crucial to have McDowell's core to coordinate with his army if he has any chance for success.

Meanwhile, guarding Valley, near the town of Winchester, was Major General Thomas Jonathan Jackson, who was now famous throughout the Confederacy, and even Europe, for his role in the Battle of Manassas, which earned him the immortal nickname of 'Stonewall'. Jackson had a small army of only 5000 men, with most of his men ill-equipped and under- supplied, but he had the following mission: "Protect the Valley from Union Occupation" and "Tie up Union forces in the region". Having lived in the valley for many years, Jackson was familiar with the valley terrain.

Jackson realised he could create a diversion if he destroyed Banks' command and give the impression of a drive on Washington itself. This would cause Federal troops to be dragged into the Valley instead of advancing onto Richmond. But the only problem was that Jackson, with his meagre forces, did not have the numbers... yet.

On 26 February 1862, Banks' large army advanced on Winchester. Jackson immediately recognised that he was heavily outnumbered, so retreated from Winchester in early March. With the Rebels in retreat and, feeling like he was in control of the Valley, Banks began to divide his force, and send the majority east to aid McClellan in the Peninsula campaign. Leaving 8500 men behind, Banks then tasked Brigadier-General James Shields with the task of destroying Jackson, whilst Banks departed to Washington.

Shields, like Banks was a politician-general but, unlike Banks, was an aggressive officer who had once challenged another politician to a duel over alleged 'libel'. The duel never took place, but that other politician was Abraham Lincoln... Luckily, by the time the war had broken out, the two men had settled their differences and had become friends. Shields attempted to pursue Jackson, but after receiving faulty intelligence that Jackson had departed the Valley, he returned to base in Winchester.



Jackson had by no means departed the Valley, he had simply retreated further South to the town of Mount Jackson, and no, it was not named after him, but rather after former President Andrew Jackson. Unfortunately for Stonewall Jackson, the Confederate intelligence wasn't any better and his reconnaissance forces reported that Shield's only had half the number he did. On March 23, believing he could destroy the Union army at their positions at Kernstown, Jackson only brought 3,800 confederates against a Union force of 8,500 men. It was only after the battle commenced that Jackson realised this disparity, and he informed his command:

"Say no more of it boys, we are in for it"

The Southerners fought valiantly, and staved off multiple union frontal assaults but were ultimately forced to retreat after running out of ammunition.

The Battle of Kernstown would be Jackson's only defeat of his entire Civil War career. Shields would often brag that he was the only Union general to best Jackson but, in reality, the honour belonged to Nathan Kimball, who had assumed command of the Union forces after Shields had been wounded in a skirmish the day earlier and spent the entire battle in a medical tent.

Although Kernstown was a minor tactical Confederate defeat, it was a strategic victory. The news of the audacity of the Confederate assault reached the desk of a paranoid Lincoln, who believed that Jackson was making a potential dash to the capital, given that there were minimal Union forces between Jackson and Washington DC. The Union high command overestimated the threat Jackson posed and Banks was ordered to return to the Valley with 19,000 men.

Of further consequence, McDowell's 40,000 strong core, the one that McClellan needed so badly for his pincer movement, was taken out of McClellan's command and ordered to stay put at Fredericksburg until Jackson's threat was cleared.

His mission accomplished, Jackson had diverted the federals from Richmond, for now.



Throughout April 1862, Jackson continued to elude Banks' forces and he managed to reorganise his forces and his forces managed to swell up to 8,000 men. In Jackson's words, his Valley campaign was only *"just getting started"*. By 25 April, Jackson had retreated with his army to Swift Run Gap in the Blue Ridge Mountains, where he set up camp. Banks' 19,000-man force pursued and set up camp at Harrisonburg. At the same time, there were over 20,000 troops scattered throughout the Allegheny Mountains under major General Fremont. The presence of this force was a thorn in Jackson's side as they threatened to link up with Banks' army to overwhelm Jackson. The vanguard of Fremont's command was led by Brigadier-General Robert Milroy with 6,500 men who began pushing east against a smaller 3,000 Confederate garrison under the command of General Edward Johnston at Stanton to try to gain access through the mountains.

Stonewall commenced his brilliant campaign by deciding to engage Milroy's isolated army first. Jackson's army was extremely mobile compared to the Federals – there is a reason they were called *Jackson's foot cavalry*.


He led his command south, then east to Mechum's Station, a stop on the Virginia Central Railroad. Banks believed Jackson was retreating from the Valley and reported such to Lincoln.

Believing Jackson was gone, Lincoln ordered Banks to once again begin his withdrawal from the Valley and to send 10,000 of his men back East to help McClellan.

The move was a clever ruse and not even Jackson's subordinates were aware of his plans. Once at Mechum's Station, Jackson's forces boarded railroads that took his command to Stanton and, by 2 May, Jackson had linked up with Johnston, where they now numbered 11,600.

If you're wondering how Jackson could pull off such fast, stunning manoeuvres, I must point out that Jackson had a secret weapon, in the form of excellently drawn maps by Jedediah Hotchkiss. Hotchkiss was a topographical engineer and lifelong friend of Jackson, who had directed Hotchkiss to provide him with a notebook of detailed maps of the valley indicating all defensive points and giving an indication of what the terrain looked like. This gave Jackson an enormous advantage, and he used these maps masterfully prior to engaging his enemies.

On 8 May, with his in-depth knowledge of the terrain and his choice of the perfect battlefield, Jackson engaged Milroy at the battle of McDowell. Despite mostly using inferior muskets and a lack of cannon, Jackson's significantly larger forces managed to overwhelm the Union. Jackson telegraphed back to Richmond, "God blessed our arms with victory at McDowell yesterday".



The news was greeted with great jubilation as the Confederacy had experienced setbacks all Spring and this victory did much to raise Southern morale. Importantly, by holding the pass at McDowell, Fremont's advance into the Valley was stopped. Indeed, on May 10, Jackson pursued the Federal forces all the way to Franklin. Satisfied that Fremont was no longer a threat, Jackson turned his attention back to Banks.

After having sent a division East, Banks was down to 8,000 men and was in the process of an orderly withdrawal to Strasburg but, only after reaching Strasberg on May 12, did Banks receive word of Jackson's victory and news that the Confederates were converging with larger numbers. Banks made the decision to fortify the town and send word to Washington for reinforcements.

On 18 May, Jackson saw his opportunity and marched his men back into the valley and united with another 8,000-strong Confederate army led by Richard S. Ewell, bringing his numbers up to 17,000.

Does Jackson then make a direct assault on Banks' fortified positions at Strasburg? Hell no!

Using his knowledge of geography, without informing his subordinates again, Jackson ordered his men to cross the rough Massanutten mountains. Many were barefoot, but Jackson drove them. The Confederates then chose to attack an unsuspecting 900strong Union garrison at Front Royal on 23 May.

The larger Confederate force overwhelmed the small Union garrison at Fort Royal and the fort fell on the same day, Banks realised that he was now cut off from potential reinforcements and, with a large Confederate army in his rear, he had no choice but to call for a retreat north to Winchester with Jackson's army in pursuit.

First Battle of Winchester



Jackson pursues Banks to Winchester – 25 May 1862

On May 24th, before Banks could reach Winchester, Jackson cut into the retreating Federal column on the Valley Turnpike in a running fight through Middletown. The Federals at the head of the line continued north to Winchester, while the rest broke and fled the Valley. Jackson hoped to pursue Banks to Winchester but some of the Confederate troops began to loot the wagons they had captured. This lost momentum, which allowed the rest of Banks' forces to safely reach Winchester that night.

To regain his momentum, Jackson attacked Winchester the following morning on 25 May. Banks' now depleted and demoralised forces were completely routed at the First Battle of Winchester and his command was officially destroyed. While trying to rally the retreating Federals, Gen. Banks shouted, *"My God, men, don't you love your country?"* One soldier turned and replied, *"Yes, and I am trying to get to it as fast as I can…"*

As the victorious Confederates entered Winchester, the entire town was celebrating. Jackson noted that, this was "one of the most stirring scenes of [his] life". Jackson then sent a 3000-strong feint to Harpers Ferry to give the impression that an invasion of the North to Washington DC was in the making.

Jackson's smashing victory at Winchester was the emotional high point of his 1862 Valley Campaign. For the Union, this entire situation was complete chaos. For a moment, the Valley laid wide open as all Union had armies been driven out entirely. Although Washington was under real threat, the psychological damage had been done. Lincoln ordered to have Jackson's annoying small army destroyed for good, making it a key priority.

Fremont, with 15,000, men was ordered to advance to Harrisonburg, and McDowell's 40,000-strong core was ordered West to confront Jackson. This order occurred just as McDowell was heading South to attack Richmond from the North, which again delayed McClellan's assault on Richmond. Lincoln's plan was to trap Stonewall in a hammer and anvil movement; even Banks' shattered command was ordered to regroup and assist.


Unfortunately for the Union, the roads through the Allegheny Mountains were so wretched and terrible that Fremont had to go North to pass around the mountains near the town of Romney. Therefore, Lincoln's elaborate trap did not work as planned. Instead, it became a pincer movement with slow-moving Union armies.

It is at this moment one can clearly see Jackson's importance. Over 52,000 men were now on a wild goose chase for an army of 17,000 and McDowell's core would not be able to assist McClellan in taking Richmond. In the end, only 10,000 men of the original 40,000 would go on to support McClellan's Peninsula campaign. The loss of McDowell's command demoralised McClellan and made him even more overly cautious in assaulting Richmond.

Unsurprisingly, Jackson's fast army was able to escape Lincoln's trap and was chased up the Valley by Fremont and McDowell's lead division under Brigadier-General Shields. They chased Jackson but were unable to combine and concentrate their forces because Jackson had burnt numerous bridges along the rivers which forced the Union armies to pursue the Confederates on opposite sides of the Massanutten mountains.

By dividing their forces, Fremont and McDowell put themselves in a position to be defeated in detail. Jackson saw this and made his stand at a river crossing. Jackson's army controlled the only bridges spanning the South Fork, preventing two Federal columns from joining together. This was where he planned to engage both armies separately.

On 8 June, Fremont struck first and encountered Ewell's Division at the battle of Cross Keys where, after fighting into the hours of the night and ordering numerous assaults against well- entrenched Confederate positions, Fremont's nerve broke and he ordered a retreat. Cross Keys became a Confederate victory. Jackson left a rearguard to watch over Fremont and concentrated the rest of his army on Shield's division, Shields then made the bizarre decision to split his brigades and ordered one to camp in the town of Port Republic.



The very next day, on 9 June, realising that the Union were only holding this town with a single Brigade, Jackson concentrated the bulk of his army on Shields at Port Republic and attacked. The battle was brutal and was even referred to as a 'hell spot' by Southern soldiers, as some areas descended into hand-to-hand fighting. However, the determined Confederates held their line and the Union was forced to retreat. Port Republic was the final victory of Jackson's Shenandoah campaign and, soon after, the legend of the great Stonewall Jackson was established. At the end of the 1862 campaign, a Virginia line officer exclaimed: *"Gallant Jackson is again Master of the Glorious Valley!"*

As seen on the slide here, despite having fewer troops, Jackson outnumbered his enemy at all battles except Kernstown and Cross Keys. He always concentrated the forces that he had at hand and never allowed the Union army to combine their forces. Instead, he looked for opportunities to defeat each command separately.

The Valley Campaign Statistics

Jnion Victory	Battle of Kernstown: 8,500 vs 3,800
Confederate Victory	Battle of McDowell: 6,500 vs 11,600
Confederate Victory	Battle of Front Royal: 900 vs 17,000
Confederate Victory	1 st Battle of Winchester: 3,500 vs 16,000
Confederate Victory	Battle of Cross Keys: 11,500 vs 5,800
Confederate Victory	Battle of Port Republic: 3,500 vs 6,000

The 1862 Valley campaign ranks as one of the greatest strategic masterpieces in military history. Jackson had marched over 350 miles, defeated three Union armies in five battles, caused 5000 Union casualties with the loss of

only 2,000 men, and captured much-needed supplies. It was ultimately a grand diversion in which he tied up elements of three separate armies totalling 52,000 men that would have otherwise been used against Richmond. This was the sheer brilliance of the campaign.

It is almost certain that the Confederate capital would have fallen if it wasn't for Jackson's Shenandoah campaign. Furthermore, products from the fertile and rich Shenandoah Valley would continue to sustain Southern soldiers and civilians alike for two more years.

What happened in the Valley also had permanent effects on the Union commanders who had failed there. Banks acquired the stigma of a loser and was never again entrusted with major field responsibilities. James Shields faded into oblivion and John C. Frémont resigned from the service after a junior officer received command of his army.

The success of the Valley campaign made Stonewall Jackson the most celebrated soldier in the Confederacy until his reputation was eventually eclipsed by Robert E Lee's. The Valley Campaign instilled unbroken optimism in the ranks of Confederates throughout Virginia and "...had broken a spell of defeat" as Historian Gary Gallagher put it.

Jackson even earned his share of admirers up North: a Washington, D.C. newspaper, *The Daily Morning Chronicle*, shared an article concerning Jackson shortly after his death:

While we are only too glad to be rid, in any way, of so terrible a foe, our sense of relief is not unmingled with emotions of sorrow and sympathy at the death of so brave a man. Every man who possesses the slightest particle of magnanimity must admire the qualities for which Stonewall Jackson was celebrated—his heroism, his bravery, his sublime devotion, his purity of character. He is not the first instance of a good man devoting himself to a bad cause.

Lincoln himself sent a letter to the editor, expressing agreement with the obituary.

If I have one problem with the Valley campaign it is this: The campaign would establish Jackson as a mythological figure amongst the Confederacy and a true icon of the Lost Cause movement. Jackson took on a quasi-religious status amongst Southerners. Indeed, each year people go on 'the Jackson Pilgrimage' and leave lemons at his gravesite in Lexington. Unfortunately, this mythological status ignores the reality.

The Man, the Myth, the Lemons Image: Strate strat

In truth, his students at West Point hated him and many of his men under his command despised him for the long gruelling marches with the lack of supplies that he demanded. One South Carolinian private commented after Port Republic that *"Jackson was insane and brutal on his men... one more of his 'victories' would have destroyed this army".*

Furthermore, the lack of information given to his subordinates caused them significant anxiety. Richard S. Ewell would write to his wife that he felt *"Jackson's risky and 'blind' manoeuvrers foreshadowed a great disaster in the future".*

The lemon legend is also a myth. Whilst he liked the fruit, most confederate armies survived off whatever foraged fruit they could find. As such, it was not uncommon to find a Confederate officer suckling whatever fruit they could find.

Historian Byron Farwell has noted that if it weren't for the Valley Campaign, Jackson would only be regarded as a decent core commander at best... because none of his other future accomplishments would come close to the Valley campaign. This is evident, as a few weeks later, Jackson would withdraw from the Shenandoah and go to support Lee fighting McClellan in the Seven Days battles. In this series of battles Jackson would perform terribly.

In three battles his troops arrived late, his core got lost a number of times and he missed many opportunities to destroy the army of the Potomac. It was the grand reverse of everything we have discussed tonight. However, the conventional narrative of Jackson often glosses over this latter performance. When I put together this presentation, I was really befuddled by the lack of critical or realistic works of Jackson.

All of this is not to diminish the importance of the Valley campaign, its strategic brilliance or the long-term psychological impact it would have on the Union. It should simply be pointed out that the man was fallible, he made mistakes, and the reality of Jackson is undoubtedly far, far more interesting than the Lost Cause mythos that came about after the war. That said, his efforts in the Valley are beautifully commemorated in John Williamson Palmer's poem, *Stonewall Jackson's Way*. The following stanza is a paean to the long marches his men endured:



John thanked Peter for his presentation – 'a very difficult act to follow' and invited questions.

Questions included what the association between Jackson and Lee before the war was; what happened to General John B. Magruder after the war; and the level of Lincoln's involvement during the war.

The Leonard Traynor Award

At our last meeting John Verhoeven was named as winner of the annual Leonard Traynor Award for Contribution to the Newsletter. At this meeting, he received his Certificate from Len.



Members will be interested to know that Len has just racked up 79 years of developing his interest in the American Civil War – from the age of 8 – and he's still learning!

Recipes taken from *Lincoln's Table*

Lafayette Cake

(Historic version)

- 2 cups unsalted butter
- 4 cups sugar (granulated or powdered)
- 6 cups flour
- 1 teaspoon baking soda
- 2 teaspoons cream of tartar
- 24 egg whites Scant teaspoon vanilla extract
- 1/2 teaspoon almond extract

Beat butter to a cream, adding gradually four cupfuls of sugar; whip to a white fluff.

Sift six cupfuls of flour with one teaspoonful of soda and two of cream of tartar, three times. Beat to a fine, firm froth the whites of twenty-four eggs.

Add the flour and egg white alternately to the butter and sugar. Add extracts. Bake the cake, in a large loaf, in a slow over for 75 to 90 minutes.

Half this recipe will make a fair-sized birthday cake, and one-quarter will serve from six to eight persons amply.

Stuffed Shad

- 1 boneless roe shad (1-2 pounds)
- ¹/₄ cup minced white onions
- 1/4 cup minced bell peppers
- 1/4 cup minced celery
- 4 tablespoons butter
- 8 ounces shad roe
- ¹/₂ cup seasoned breadcrumbs
- 3 pieces of bacon cut in half Juice from one medium-sized lemon

Melt butter. Sauté onion, bell pepper, and celery until tender. Add breadcrumbs. Break up the roe and add to the mixture. Add salt and pepper. Mix well and cook lightly.

Place shad in a buttered dish with the flesh side up. Stuff cavities of shad where the bones have been removed.

Place a little bit of water around the edge of the fish to prevent it from drying out during cooking. Cover and bake for 20-25 minutes at 375 degrees.

When about three minutes of cooking time is left, place bacon across the top of the fish.

Drip the juice of the lemon on top of the fish.

Return to oven and finish cooking. Serves 4-6.

With thanks to Len's library