


Sumter to Appomattox



American Civil War Round Table of Australia (New South Wales Chapter)

www.americancivilwar.asn.au

Patron: Prof the Hon Bob Carr

President's Message

Dear Round Table members,
When I heard of the sudden death in Vienna of Helena Carr, the wife for 50 years of our Patron, Bob Carr, I sent a note to Bob via Margot, his Executive Assistant, expressing sympathy on behalf of the Round Table. I and others from the Round Table then attended the Requiem Mass for Helena on 14 November at St Mary's Cathedral. Bob presented the Eulogy. It was a loving account of his long relationship with Helena. Bob is living through what we all have either experienced or dread: the loss of a partner, husband or wife. We sympathise.

I want to assure Bob that the Round Table is a group of his friends that has enjoyed his active participation and hope that it continues to be a place where he can be just plain Bob and enjoy himself.

We are interrupting our progression through the war to honour the four-legged heroes, the horses and mules of both armies. Our approximate chronological progress through the war has given us a good year. If walking encyclopedias are a little bored by material they already know, please be patient.

We are still in 1862. Events in the vicinity of Richmond will have our attention when we return in February to the chronology of events.

Don't forget to pay your subscription. Also, please volunteer to do a 5- or 10-minute presentation to your friends on a topic of relevance to our chronological progress. Also, bring a friend.

Ian McIntyre
22nd November 2023

Number 121 Nov. – Dec. 2023

Our Next Meeting

The Roseville Club

Wednesday

6th December from 6.15pm

AGM at 6:45 then our Christmas function
- the cost for the Christmas function is \$60 per head and details for booking your seat (and one for any guests you wish to bring) have been sent out previously in a separate flyer from the Secretary and to please book by Friday 1st December so we can know the numbers for catering purposes.

The Four-Legged Heroes of the Civil War

Three members of our group will discuss:

The legendary role of horses and mules in the Civil War of:

- i. Cavalry*
- ii. Artillery*
- ii. Logistics*

As usual, we are keen to hear from our membership so if you have a particular subject, please get in touch with Program Director John Morrison.

On our **Website** you will always find the date of our next meeting. Our Facebook page is also www.americancivilwar.asn.au

Our Next Meeting

The Four-Legged Heroes of the Civil War



During the Civil War more than three million horses and mules served as an integral part of the Union and Confederate Armies and almost half died during the war. Horses were important for i) the hauling of artillery, ii) the moving of wounded and supplies, and iii) cavalry.

A number of horses became quite famous – almost as famous as their sometimes-legendary riders!

The acquisition of horses and mules, their food, and myriad other equipment – including saddles, harness, and shoes – was a huge logistical undertaking. Provisioning and caring for horses and mules represented a bigger challenge than feeding men and caring for their wellbeing.

At our forthcoming meeting we will have presentations from several members looking at the critical and central role the horse played in the Civil War. Rod Cooke will talk about Cavalry horses; Mike Bosch will discuss the importance of horses to Artillery; and Denis Smith will outline the critical role horses played in logistics – especially the transport of men, supplies and the wounded.

Our Last Meeting

We were privileged at our last meeting to have three short talks, the first by President Ian McIntyre and the following two by Norm Delaney.

The Surrender of Fort Pulaski, Georgia 10-11 April 1862 *Ian McIntyre*

Ian began with the fact that this event occurred at the same week as Shiloh occurred. Fort Pulaski is on an island adjacent to the Savannah River in the northern part of Georgia, very close to South Carolina. This fort was guarding the entrance to Savannah Harbour. It

was built after the War of 1812 and was one of many built to protect the nation against foreign invasion.

In April 1861, President Lincoln had decreed that the South would be cut off and prevented from importing and exporting goods and Fort Pulaski was part of that campaign.

Fort Pulaski, which took 18 years to be built, is an elegant, brick building built on marshy land with 70-foot-long piles. The walls are 7-11 feet deep and claimed to be impenetrable.



This claim was correct in 1862 because cannons at the time were smooth bore and successful penetration relied on multiple cannon balls hitting the same part of a wall. Another factor was that Fort Pulaski lay outside the range of the nearest island, which meant that an effective bombardment was not possible.

On 3rd January 1861, before the Confederacy was formed, Georgia State Troops seized the Fort, which until then had never been manned as a fort. In December 1861, the Confederates abandoned a neighbouring island, judging it to be too isolated to be a threat. This was a big mistake because, in March and April 1862, the Union Army occupied this island and began bombarding the Fort with 36 cannon, 5 of which were rifled – a new invention (in fact, Fort Pulaski was the trial of this new initiative). The rifled cannons were much more accurate with a longer range.

The Union Army began its bombardment on 10th April, and by midday the following day, had breached the wall, due to the longer range and increased accuracy of the new cannon. The large holes in the wall exposed the magazine and the Fort's Commander, aware of this danger, decided not to endanger his troops and so surrendered the Fort after a 30-hour siege.



As a result of this success, non-rifled cannon became superseded.

The Fort was used as a prisoner-of-war camp by both sides. The main consequence of the Union occupation was to block the Savannah River, preventing the Confederacy from making use of it, and so became part of the ongoing restriction of trade in the South.

Ian commented on the quality of the brickwork and the size this fort, which was built later than many other forts and was thus an improvement on them. It can be seen that the corner of the Fort was rebuilt later.



Ian's interesting talk elicited a lively discussion on forts, bricks, weaponry and other related topics. The name 'Pulaski' relates to a Polish Brigadier General in the Revolutionary War.

Small Arms 1860-1862 ***Norm Delaney***



New member Norm Delaney's first of two interesting and well-researched short presentations was on changes in the use of shoulder arms in the Civil War and whether the introduction of the rifled musket had the great effect on the War that is claimed.

Norm began with a reference to cannons, which were smooth bore, as were shoulder arms. By 1862, rifled cannons had been introduced and caused great damage at Fort Pulaski.

It is common knowledge that the rifled musket and the minie ball were important in the Civil War. But did these two inventions actually change the course of the Civil War? Did the increased effective range of fire of the Enfield and Springfield rifled muskets make an obvious difference to the outcomes of battles?

By the end of 1862, both the percussion smooth bore and the Enfield and Springfield rifled muskets were the main shoulder arms found in both the Union and Confederate armies.

The Springfield was invented in 1855 and was being manufactured in a number of armories by 1861 which meant that both armies were able to access them in large quantities at the outset of the War. However, the numbers varied. Pre-War, the Confederate states had 175,000 shoulder arms but the Union states had 503,000. Of these, the Confederate arsenals had 140,000 smooth bores but only 35,000 Springfield and Enfield rifles. In contrast, the Union arsenals had 400,000 smooth bore weapons and 100,000 Springfields, as well as 3,000 breech-loaded weapons which the Confederates did not have.

Norm acknowledged that the only way to acquire weapons was to make, steal or buy them. Once the Anaconda Plan started to take effect, the chances of the South acquiring guns was substantially reduced. However, the blockade runners were often successful as is illustrated by General Grant's discovery at Vicksburg of 60,000 stockpiled Enfield rifles.

During the War, the Confederates were able to purchase from Europe 40,000 smooth bore and 300,000 rifled muskets. After they had taken Harper's Ferry, they were also able to access the equipment to make their own weapons although General Gorgas, the Quartermaster, had difficulty accessing arms for distribution to armies other than the Army of Tennessee.

At the end of the Civil War, contemporaneous records show that the Confederates had 622,000 weapons. The Union, in comparison, had 3,763,000.

At the beginning of the War, there were an insufficient number of weapons to arm all the soldiers on either side. Many of the Confederate regiments, especially those from Texas, brought their own. Even though the Springfields had been sent to armories all around the country, the fact that there was an inadequate supply meant that smooth bores

and old Mississippi guns – partly rifled – were brought out of mothballs and started to be used.

After the battles at The Seven Pines and Antietam, it is highly improbable that soldiers were able to fight effectively with the weapons they had at the time, an issue which Norm addressed. The tactics used in 1862 were a mirror image of the way that Napoleonic War forces had fought. That is, the troops lined up, walked forward, stopped, fired a volley, a line behind fired a volley and they moved on.

The possession of the new, more effective, weapons was obviously important. Records, however, show that even by Gettysburg, six months later, Union forces still only had 70% of their regiments using rifled muskets and the rest had a combination of smooth bores, Austrian or Belgian rifles and other inefficient types of guns, which they did not want to keep. After Gettysburg, most regiments, especially Confederate got more serviceable weapons from battlefield salvaging.

At the end of 1862, weapons were still only single-shot and not multiple-shot weapons that came into force in mid-1863. What did this mean? It meant that armies would line up, move forward towards each other, and fire a volley. Each regiment had a sprinkling of different arms, and records of battles show that 150 yards was the average distance of fire.

As regiments were supplied with both smooth bore and rifled muskets, it meant that troops ranged in a line would wait until they were within range to fire – 50 to 80 yards – which was the effective distance for a smooth bore firing a round ball.



'To the Last Round' by Keith Rocco, depicting the 21st Ohio Infantry

The only other way they could be effective was if the smooth bores were loaded with buck and ball – a spray of projectiles – which, in the range limit, could be more effective than firing a minie ball because the spray would hit many more soldiers and cause more damage.



Keith Rocco's depiction of a Union advance

By the end of 1862, Springfield and Enfield rifled muskets were mixed together. These had a range of 200 yards or longer, depending on the training of the soldier, while smooth bore had a range of 50-80 yards. As a consequence, evidence shows that officers told the men to "fire low and fire in line".



Keith Rocco depiction of Confederate troops in formation

How was the presence of the rifled musket more important in deciding the desired outcome of a battle? Evidence shows they were never used to their full capacity because of the tactics employed. Therefore, was the rifled musket as important as alleged by commentators, historians and those who assert that it was the minie ball that had made the difference in the outcome of battles in the Civil War?

Norm suggested that the only thing that made the difference was the introduction of the 7-shot Spencer and 16-shot Henry repeaters. The Spencers, although they had been made earlier, did not become accepted by the Union Army until after 1863. There were some at

Gettysburg, especially with some of the cavalry, and the Henry came later.

The Confederates would have had the option of using them if they could access them through battlefield salvage, but they had no capacity to manufacture the ammunition needed, so they never had the opportunity to use these weapons. Later, they would complain about encountering a regiment of Union forces who would start shooting on Friday and continue shooting to Sunday and from underwater as well.

Norm then asked the audience to consider whether the rifled musket at the end of 1862 was the really important weapon in the war or whether it was the tactics employed that negated its efficiency.

In question time, Norm answered a query and confirmed that only black powder had been used in that time. A member of the audience, Wayne, said that, if Civil War battle tactics with Napoleonic battle tactics were compared, Napoleonic battles were much larger in scale, but casualties were far higher in the American Civil War. This implied that the rifled musket – ‘a killing weapon’ – was an effective weapon change. The Springfield had a significant effect on tactics by showing that frontal attacks were no longer effective.

Norm addressed this by saying that he was not referring to defence tactics. He described the tactic of the two armies coming together in rows, with one line approaching another line of troops. In this situation, the smooth bore was equally as effective as rifled weapons. It was later, when there was a change in tactics from offensive to defensive, and when Lee dug in, that there was a difference in the effectiveness of the rifles.

Wayne referred to an 1855 drill manual which considered the effectiveness of flanking exercises. Norm replied by enquiring if this was John Upton’s manual, which introduced tactics such as troops going in at a run and then spreading out. After the war, he produced new manuals with tactics that superseded those that Halleck and Winfield Scott had produced. All they had done was interpret the manuals of France.

New Orleans ***Norm Delaney***


Norm began his second presentation by referring to Ian’s talk on forts and their relevance to the defence of New Orleans. At the time of the Civil War, it was the second-biggest city in the USA, with a busy

international port which, after secession, was an essential objective of Union forces. This was because blockade-running continued despite the Anaconda Plan and despite the blockades having had some effect on river traffic on the Mississippi.

In October 1861, a small naval battle had been fought at the mouth of the Mississippi River and the Confederate Mosquito Fleet was able to chase away the Union Blockade. This was not because of their skill or ability but because the Commander of the Union Fleet ‘turned chicken and zapped off’.


However, the blockade needed to continue so President Lincoln decided to attempt to capture New Orleans, Baton Rouge, Mobile and Galveston so that they could gain supremacy over the Lower Mississippi and thereby capture Texas.

General Benjamin ‘Spoons’ Butler was put in charge of the Army and, in order to capture these towns, cooperate with the Navy. With the capture of New Orleans being the main target, troops under his command met with Flag Admiral Farragut and Commodore Porter at Ship Island, off the coast of Louisiana near the entrance to the Mississippi River.



Civil War Mississippi River Map published 1895

Before undertaking this operation, Butler had met with President Lincoln and had said that if he didn’t take New Orleans “you’ll never see me alive again”. He embarked with 14,000 troops onto a steamship ‘Mississippi’. From Ship Island it was 60 miles up to New Orleans. At the bend in the river, there were two forts, Fort Jackson and Fort St. Philip, one of which was a masonry fort, but at this point, rifled cannon was not used. However, they made use of many mortar ships.




Map of Forts Jackson and St. Philip

The Confederates, at the same time, felt safe from invasion because of the troops stationed in New Orleans and because of levee banks, a chain across the river and two forts. They also felt that an invasion would come from the north, where the Union had had several successes, and so they stripped New Orleans of troops and relocated them north.

The population of New Orleans consisted of a wide range of people including, amongst others, slaves-holders, slaves, pirates, gamblers, and thieves. There was a general feeling of being safe, with a local journal writing, "Our only fear is that the Northern invaders may not appear. We have made such extensive preparations to receive them that it would be a vexation if their invincible armada escapes the fate that we have in store for them".

The test was soon to come. General Butler and the naval commanders arranged a plan for the capture of New Orleans which required an attack on the forts below the city by Commodore Porter's bomb vessels – the mortar boats – with Admiral Farragut's stronger vessels remaining in reserve until the guns of the forts were silenced.



One of the 'bummers', as they were known in the Union Navy. Mortar Schooner of Porter's Bombardment fleet, New Orleans 1862.

Many mortar shells were fired into the forts, but their guns were not silenced. Those inside the forts continued to return fire despite being affected by the river flooding in. As a result, General Farragut decided not to wait, but to take his ships up the river to the forts and "take his chances".

On 17th April, the fleets of Farragut and Porter were in the river with Farragut as Chief Commander. Butler, with 9,000 troops, was at the south-west pass. The fleet consisted of 47 armed vessels, and these went up the river with Porter's gunboats leading, heavily camouflaged with mud and tree branches. Eventually they were able to draw close to the forts and start firing without initially being noticed.

At the same time, the Mississippi was very full and the boom and other obstructions near Fort Jackson were swept away. The chain across the river was cut. Suddenly New Orleans was looking vulnerable.

A battle began on the morning of 18th April, with shots fired from Fort Jackson. Porter's mortar boats responded, supported by Farragut's gunships. Farragut decided to proceed past the forts, attacking them as he went past, and Captain Bell was commanded to attack the Confederate fleet. It was a dark night and, according to an eyewitness, "the scene became terrible" and likening it to an earthquake with the noise from 260 great guns.



Attack of the Union fleet, April 24, 1862 – Fort Jackson at left and Fort St. Philip at right

Unsurprisingly, the Union forces were victorious. Eleven Confederate vessels had been destroyed and only one of Farragut's. This battle was 'short, sharp and decisive' and the way was clear to New Orleans.

The Union forces only lost 30 killed and 125 injured whereas the Confederates lost 700 soldiers and sailors.

A strange event occurred when General Butler landed his troops at the rear Fort St. Philip. The

alarmed garrison mutinied and surrendered to Butler's pickets, declaring they'd been pressed into service and would fight no more.

Porter continued to bombard Fort Jackson but, after Fort St. Philip surrendered, the commander of Fort Jackson, in charge of 1000 soldiers, also surrendered.

How was New Orleans taken? Farragut, with 13 vessels above the forts, had gone up to New Orleans and tried to negotiate a surrender but initially the mayor wouldn't agree. However, when he heard that soldiers had surrendered, he then surrendered the city. On 1st May, General Butler got off his vessel and walked through the city with 2,400 troops. No shot was fired.

Before they left, the Confederates burnt millions of dollars' worth of cotton (15,000 bales), tobacco and sugar, along with wharves, gunboats and unfinished vessels. It was a disaster for them.

Admiral Farragut held the population at bay with guns until General Butler arrived on 1 May and, from his headquarters at the St. Charles Hotel, took possession of the city.

General Butler imposed a form of martial law until he was relieved in December 1862. He left with a price on his head and would be hanged if captured. Even so, his administration restored commercial life and sanitation and other services, allowing a level of normalcy to return. He had secured the country's second largest city at little cost.

New Orleans had had a population of 160,000 before the war but this had decreased to 140,000 when many, including troops, escaped the city before the Butler's takeover.

The loss of New Orleans was a terrible blow to the Confederates. A historian at the time said it diminished their resources – their grain and cattle – and gave the enemy the Mississippi River, with all its means of operation, a base of operations.

So was restored to the Union the state of Louisiana after the troops moved up the river and took Baton Rouge, but they could not capture Mobile, which held out until the end of the war.

Norm's informative talk was followed by a lively discussion with topics including the fact that the Anaconda Plan and the occupation of New Orleans contributed to the Union's success; ironclads; slave-owning blacks; and a chamber pot in a museum with the Butler's face in it.



Civil War Profile

Jedediah Hotchkiss (1828 – 1899)


The Confederacy's Mapmaker Extraordinaire

With thanks to Dan Howard



Jedediah Hotchkiss


Jedediah Hotchkiss was born to farming parents in Windsor, New York in 1828. His father enrolled him in Windsor Academy. Early on, he developed a fascination with geography and geology. In time he became a teacher at his own Mossy Creek School in the Luray Valley, part of the Shenandoah Valley. After marrying Sara Comfort in 1853, the couple settled on a farm near Churchville, Virginia, where Hotchkiss and his brother established the successful Loch Willow Academy, and during this time he taught himself map-making and honed his skills to a very high level.



Hotchkiss and his Family

When the war came, despite his brother's support for the Union and his wife being a native of Pennsylvania, Hotchkiss sided with the Confederacy and joined the rebel army in June 1861

The Union had retained control of existing government map making organisations and virtually the whole of the U.S. Army's Corp of Topographical Engineers remained loyal to the Union. The North also had a far more developed printing industry for map production. In these circumstances Hotchkiss' skills were like gold to the Confederacy which used them to their fullest advantage, no more so than when Hotchkiss was appointed as topographer to General Stonewall Jackson in the Shenandoah Valley, ground that Hotchkiss had come to know well.




A contemporary aerial view of the Shenandoah Valley

In a paper written at the US Naval War College entitled *Major General T J Jackson's Shenandoah Valley Campaign – an operational art analysis*, Major James Hook wrote:

An analysis of the campaign demonstrates Jackson's masterful ability to properly balance the operational factors of space, time and forces. The resulting freedom of action allowed Jackson to stymie significantly larger Union forces, who were specifically diverted from the Federal main effort at Richmond and detailed to destroy him. In every case, Jackson was victorious by using operational factors in the form of manoeuvre warfare, to concentrate superior combat power on the field at the decisive time and place, against smaller enemy formations.

Although Jackson had been a VMI professor before the war, he did not know the Shenandoah Valley well; nor had the valley ever been mapped with any accuracy. After Jackson's early defeat at the first battle of Kernstown (March 26, 1862) – which was largely the result of poor reconnaissance and intelligence gathering on the location of the enemy – he was determined not to make the same mistake again. So, Jackson summoned for the first time his newly appointed topographical engineer, Jedediah Hotchkiss, and gave him a portentous direction: *"I want you to make me a map of the Valley, from Harpers Ferry to Lexington, showing all the points of offense and defence in those places."*

Given that the Valley was 150 miles long and 25 miles wide, this was a monumental task, but that's precisely what Hotchkiss did, spending the next several months compiling his famous map of the Shenandoah Valley – fully over eight feet long when it is unrolled. The first advice that Hotchkiss gave Jackson was that his current line on Stoney Creek at Woodstock was



"STONEWALL" AND THE MEN WHO BORE HIS ORDERS

Their honors came not easily to Jackson's staff officers. Tiresome himself, regardless of all personal comforts, he seemed to consider others endowed with like qualities. After a day of marching and fighting it was no unusual thing for him to send a staff member on a thirty or forty mile ride. He was on terms of easy friendship and confidence with his aides off duty, but his orders were explicit and irrevocable. He had no confidants as to his military designs—quite the opposite: Before starting on his march to Harper's Ferry he called for a map of the Pennsylvania frontier, and made many inquiries as to roads and localities to the north of Frederick, whereas his route lay in the opposite direction. His staff, like his soldiers, first feared his apparent rashness, and then admired him for his success.

General T. J. 'Stonewall' Jackson and his staff – Hotchkiss is at 10 o'clock with the full beard

Stonewall Jackson's fabled Shenandoah Valley Campaign is a magnificent example of tactical manoeuvre and movement by which, time and again, Jackson was able to surprise, bewilder, out-fox and defeat the considerably larger Union forces arrayed against him. He also achieved the strategic goal of relieving Federal pressure on Richmond by diverting Union troops into the Valley. Jackson's campaigns continue to be studied in war colleges and such was his success that Jackson became a military celebrity in his own lifetime.

indefensible and that Jackson should move to Rude's Hill, a small promontory south of Mount Jackson, that was defensible. Jackson agreed and reorganised his command to Rude's Hill for the remainder of his 1862 campaign.

Jackson provided Hotchkiss, now a member of his staff, with a wagon and driver equipped with compasses, an altimeter, and other surveying equipment.


As noted in National Geographic's *Atlas of the Civil War*, field surveying at the time was based on triangulation, with surveyors making observations of a distant point at both ends of a baseline. They would plot their observations on a sheet of paper placed upon a plane table that was mounted on a tripod and fitted with a sighting scope. The scope in turn was connected to a ruler that was level with the paper which enabled the surveyor to plot the line of sight to a distant feature, then compute its angle relative to the baseline, thus enabling its distance to be calculated using trigonometry. Below is a photo of this same method still being used by diggers in WW II, which illustrates the technique:




Sometimes additional instruments such as theodolites and transits, providing even more accurate measurements, were used. When on the move and needing rapid estimates of distances, surveyors might use compasses and walk or ride calculating the number of strides by man or horse. More accurate measurements were made using standard 66 feet long chains that had 100 iron links, or the newly patented retractable steel tapes.

Hotchkiss' brilliant map, together with regular briefings from Hotchkiss regarding local terrain throughout the campaign, gave Jackson the priceless advantage of a thorough understanding of the geography, topography, location of rivers, passes, woods, fords, farmhouses and virtually every important feature of his theatre of his operations, without

which he would never have achieved the remarkable successes that he did.



A photo of Hotchkiss' 8 feet long Shenandoah Valley map now in the Library of Congress



A close up of a part of the map showing its tremendous detail

Captain Hotchkiss served under Jackson for the rest of the general's life and produced a large volume of accurate, detailed and even beautiful maps. He aided the general by personally directing troop movements across terrain which he had studied with his expert's eye. Hotchkiss served with Jackson in the Valley Campaign, the Northern Virginia Campaign (including the Battle of Cedar Mountain, the Second Battle of Bull Run and the Battle of Chantilly), the Maryland Campaign (including Harpers Ferry and Antietam), and the Battle of Fredericksburg.

In *'Getting There First – Essays on Three Civil War Mapmakers'*, map historian E B McElfresh observes that "Hotchkiss' maps in the field and 'route' maps were essentially sketches, prepared to meet the needs of an army on the march. Distances on them were from visual estimates made by a well-trained eye or were based on the gait of a horse or a rag tied to a wagon wheel.

The maps would show the residences and farms with the names of the occupants meticulously noted. Often the best directions the inhabitants could give was to their immediate neighbours, so the names worked as route markers. The condition and surface of the roads was noted along with woods, water courses and field crops. Carefully indicated as well were the 'road services' necessary to a mid-nineteenth-century army – blacksmith

shops, grist mills and even shoe shops. Even these spare and utilitarian maps, when done by Hotchkiss, received deft finishing touches – coloured pencils and water colours making the sketches easier to look at and comprehend.”

Another of Hotchkiss’ crowning achievements was the survey and pathfinding work that he accomplished in the prelude to the Battle of Chancellorsville. In May 1863, Jackson asked Hotchkiss for eight maps of the area west of Fredericksburg and, along with local residents, Hotchkiss discovered the route that Jackson’s corps took along an obscure woodcutter’s road, hidden from the Union Army’s view, in Jackson’s famous flanking march against General Joe Hooker’s Army. The ensuing rout of the Union Army was the climax of what many consider was Lee’s and Jackson’s finest campaign.

But Jackson did not have long to savour the fruits of the victory. Hotchkiss was riding with Jackson when, that very night, Jackson was mortally wounded by friendly fire when returning to his lines at dusk, having been studying the ground ahead with a number of his staff. One of Hotchkiss’ closest companions and tent-mate was among those killed, Captain James Boswell, who was the Chief Engineer of the corps. The last duty Hotchkiss performed for Jackson was the melancholy one of guiding Jackson’s ambulance as safely and comfortably as possible to Guinea’s Station, well behind the battle lines.




The wounding of Stonewall Jackson at Chancellorsville

The victory at Chancellorsville was so momentous and the ground won so valuable that General Lee ordered that Hotchkiss should make a map of the battlefield, including an area of approximately two hundred and fifty square miles from Belvedere, southeast of Fredericksburg to Ellwood, west of the Old Wilderness Tavern, and from the Rapidan river on the north to Todd’s Tavern on the south.

Despite this being mentally challenging for Hotchkiss because of the trauma he had experienced from the death of Jackson and the unsavoury nature of the task which required him to pass among the many killed in the battle in the course of making his map, the result was another masterpiece of cartography by Hotchkiss (see below) which provided much valuable assistance to Confederate commanders during subsequent campaigns.

After the death of Jackson, Hotchkiss continued his valuable work for other Confederate commanders and so made a significant contribution to the cause of the South throughout the war.

After Appomattox, Hotchkiss was given parole and managed to retain ownership of his extensive map collection, some of which were even purchased by U S Grant!



Hotchkiss’ detailed Map of the Battle of Chancellorsville commissioned by General R E Lee (Library of Congress)

In peacetime Hotchkiss returned to Staunton, Virginia and reopened his school. He was active in promoting veterans’ affairs and the rehabilitation of the war-ravaged Shenandoah Valley, including through economic interests in mining and timber. He wrote the Virginia volume to the 12 volume Confederate Military History and in 1881 was elected a member of the American Philosophical Society. He died aged 71 at his home ‘The Oaks’ in Staunton. The home, which Hotchkiss played a large part in designing, still stands and is on the National Register of Historic Places.



‘The Oaks’



AGM President's Report

Since the last Annual General Meeting and including that meeting, we have held six in-person meetings and no Zoom meetings. I am pleased to record that because I have developed a pathological dislike of screen meetings.

I thank our wonderful committee for making the task of being President of our Round Table so easy. The Committee for 2023 has been John Morrison (Program Director and Vice President); Dan Howard (Secretary); Wayne Morrison (Treasurer); Jannette Greenwood (Newsletter Editor); Peter Zacharatos (Membership Director); and Bruce McLennan (Immediate Past President) – identical to 2022.

Also, as in 2022, the Committee has held six formal minuted meetings and many additional informal discussions in 2023. They are a very good group indeed! And they get on with each other! I also want to acknowledge the invited input of Phil Shanahan and John Verhoeven, who have both helped us to develop our approximately chronological program throughout the year.

We held member meetings on 19 December 2022, 20 February, 17 April, 19 June, 22 August, 17 October and now this AGM on 6 December. Six excellent editions of the newsletter have been published in 2023. The newsletters can all be found on our website and are an invaluable record of our presentations and proceedings. The recipient of the Len Traynor Award for contribution to the Newsletter has been chosen and it will be presented at the December meeting. The awardee last year was Jannette Greenwood, editor of the Newsletter. It is difficult not to award it to Jannette or Dan Howard, another past recipient because of their contributions, but we have resisted that temptation.

The newsletters record that presentations throughout the year included "Fanatic Heart", the story of John Mitchel and Thomas Meagher, transported as convicts from Ireland to Van Diemen's Land, who escaped to the USA to fight on opposite sides in the Civil War (Tom Keneally); "1860-61 Overview, The Opening Stages of the War" (John Morrison); "The Organisation of the Armies" (Philip Shanahan);

"The First Battle of Manassas/Bull Run, July 1861" (John Verhoeven); "The Battle of Ball's Bluff, October 1861" (Bob Carr); "The Anaconda Plan" (Sandy Moore); "The Trent Affair, November and December 1861" (Dan Howard); "George Brinton McClellan" (Tony Kovacevic); "Fort Donelson & Fort Henry, January and February 1862" (Peter Zacharatos); "The Battle of Hampton Roads, March 1862" (John Verhoeven); "Shiloh – 6th Mississippi's Charge, discussion of a painting" (Angus Hordern); "New Mexico, March 1862" (Mike Bosch); "Shiloh/Pittsburgh Landing, April 1862" (John Morrison); "Fort Pulaski, April 1862" (Ian McIntyre); and "Small Arms 1860-62" and "New Orleans, April 1862" (Norm Delaney).

Tom Keneally was presented with Honorary Life Membership of the Association after his presentation as our guest speaker for the meeting on 19 December 2022.

Thank you all. We have had a successful year!

Ian McIntyre

New members

We are delighted to welcome new members to our Roundtable.

Call for short talks

Our short ten-minute presentations on a particular battle or person have been a great success in revealing the depth of talent within our group.

Remember that we are a group of friends and a friendly audience. I know there are several amongst us who have not yet broken cover but who would be interesting and insightful presenters.

Please do not hesitate to volunteer to myself or John Morrison on a topic of your choice, be it short or long.

Ian McIntyre

This publication is the official newsletter of the American Civil War Round Table of Australia (NSW Chapter). All enquiries regarding the newsletter should be addressed to the Secretary of the Chapter by phone on 0411 745 707 or email: secretary@americancivilwar.asn.au

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