AMERICAN CIVILWAR ROUND TABLE OF AUSTRALIA
(NSW Chapter)

JAMES LONGSTREET

- LEE'S TARNISHED OR UNTARNISHED LIEUTENANT?

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This paper has been prepared as the basis for presentations to the New South Wales and Queensland Chapters of the American Civil War Round Table of Australia.

This paper seeks to provide a fresh look at the life of General James Longstreet, CSA, and, in particular, the controversy that engulfed him after the War that has denied him, until recent times, his proper place in American history.

The paper is not an attempt to deify Longstreet in the way that the South raised Lee to his godlike status, particularly after his death in 1870. Rather, it seeks simply to present a balanced view of the Longstreet's war record, including his performance at Gettysburg, examine the validity of the charges brought against him after Lee's death and indicate the success that this campaign was to have in denying him his niche in history.

In preparing this paper reference has been to a variety of primary sources, including letters written by Longstreet himself, and a number of books written in recent times that are serving as catalysts in the reassessment of Longstreet and his contribution to the South. These books, particularly those authored by Piston and Wert and the collection of essays edited by DiNardo & Nofi, are highly recommended.

It is hoped that this presentation might provide some new insights into the general nicknamed "Old Pete" by his friends and referred to by Lee on more than one occasion as "My Old Warhorse".

John Cook

INTRODUCTION

The title of this paper is taken from William Garrett Piston's book[i] "*Lee's Tarnished Lieutenant*", one of a number of books written in recent times that is providing an ongoing re-assessment James Longstreet's contribution to the American Civil War and the post-war Reconstruction. The paper seeks to correct the "traditional wisdom" of earlier times in which one of the Confederacy's most competent corps commanders became its most vilified and regarded, after Appomattox, as the "Judas of the Lost Cause" and the scapegoat for Lee's and the South's defeat.

The paper first surveys Longstreet's early life including his time at West Point, his pre-Civil War military service and the important aspects of his family situation that were significant influences in advancing his military career.

Longstreet's Civil War performance as a battlefield commander is then considered from the time he commanded a brigade at Blackburn's Ford and First Manassas in 1861 to the surrender at Appomattox Courthouse in April 1865, where he was commander of the First Corps and Lee's second-in-command. In this regard, it is worth noting that although his record was mixed, particularly in independent command, Longstreet served with the Army of Northern Virginia[ii] longer than any other senior officer, including Lee. He was present at all major battles from 1861 through 1863, except Chancellorsville, at which time he was detached for duty in southeastern Virginia for the Suffolk campaign. He played a critical role at the Battle of Gettysburg and it is his performance in this battle that was subsequently the focus of the campaign to smear his reputation and question his loyalty to the Confederate cause. Sent west to aid the Army of Tennessee, his leadership was a key part of the Confederate victory at Chickamauga in September 1863, but his subsequent brief period of independent command in Eastern Tennessee in the winter of 1863-1864 raised doubts about his leadership[iii]. Returning to Virginia with his First Corps in early 1864, Longstreet was severely wounded on the final day of the Battle of the Wilderness in a "friendly fire" incident[iv]. He did not return to duty with his First Corps until mid-October 1864 but, from that time, remained as corps commander and Lee's second-in-command until the surrender in 1865.

The next part of the paper outlines Longstreet's post-war life. It focuses on the scurrilous campaign by the "anti-Longstreet cabal" that sought to blacken his reputation and blame him for the South losing the War. In this regard, it will be noted that this campaign was largely successful and helped significantly by Longstreet himself. His ineptitude as a writer in responding to the attacks on his reputation displayed "…in old age, vanity and jealousy which had not been evident in his wartime service" and tended to confirm, rather than disprove, his guilt in the eyes of his contemporaries.

The final part of the paper discusses the attempts in recent times to re-assess Longstreet's place in history and, without seeking to deify him, correct the earlier "traditional wisdom" of his Civil War performance.

LONGSTREET'S EARLY LIFE

James Longstreet was born on his paternal grandfather's plantation near Edgefield, South Carolina on January 8, 1821, but was raised in the family home near Gainesville, Georgia, until 1830 when he went to live with his famous uncle Augustus Baldwin Longstreet in Augusta, Georgia. It was this uncle who was responsible for much of Longstreet's early education.

In 1833, his father died in a cholera epidemic in Augusta and his mother moved with the family to live in Sommerville in northern Alabama. Although Longstreet stayed with his uncle, Augustus Longstreet, in Augusta presumably to complete his education, it was from Alabama that, at 16 years of age, he received an appointment as a cadet to the United States Military Academy at West Point.

Longstreet entered West Point in 1838 where, in his own words, he:

> *"…had more interest in the school of the soldier, horsemanship, sword exercise and the outside game of foot-ball (sic) than in the academic courses"* [v]

The curriculum undertaken by Longstreet at West Point was designed to produce competent engineers and sub-unit commanders and was one of the best engineering schools of the 19th century. Longstreet's studies for the first two years were devoted entirely to the study of Mathematics and French, whilst the major course in the third year was what we now would call Physics. The senior year focused on military engineering with some brief coverage of infantry and artillery tactics.

In 1842, Longstreet graduated 54th out of the 56 cadets[vi] who successfully completed the course. This low ranking within the graduating class needs to be put in perspective, as 50% of those commencing the course in 1838 had "dropped out". That he was near the bottom of the surviving 50% of students should not be seen as a shortcoming in his educational achievements. Indeed, his graduation meant that his standard of education placed him in the top decile of white males of his generation in America and Europe.

What this low ranking did mean, however, was that he was not able to choose his assignment on graduation, as were the top cadets. He was assigned to Infantry[vii] and posted to the Fourth US Infantry Regiment stationed at Jefferson Barracks, Missouri. It was here that Longstreet was to first meet the raven-haired teenager whom he was to marry in 1848. Maria Louise Garland was the younger daughter of the Regiment's second-in-command, Lieutenant Colonel (later Brevet Brigadier General) John Garland and with her elder sister was much sought after by the unmarried officers of the Regiment. Longstreet and Louise, as she was known, shared the limited social life at Jefferson Barracks until Longstreet's regiment was transferred to Louisiana in 1844.

It was almost three years before the couple was to see each other again but in that time Longstreet had distinguished himself in his chosen profession. He participated in most of the major actions in the Mexican War and received two brevets for gallantry under fire. He survived a serious leg wound at Chapultepec and returned from the War on medical furlough as a brevet major, his substantive rank being first lieutenant[viii]. At this time Louise's father, now a

substantive full colonel and brevet major general himself as a result of war service consented to Louise's marriage to this "high flying" officer and they were married on March 8, 1848, at Lynchburg, Va. Their son, John Garland Longstreet, was born on December 26, 1848, the first of ten children of whom only five survived to adulthood[ix].

The excitement of war gave way to the realities of peacetime service. The period of 1848 - 1861 was one during which there were few opportunities for professionally challenging postings and promotion was agonisingly slow. For Longstreet the restricted avenues for advancement in the antebellum army was softened somewhat in relation to the postings to which he was assigned by the influence of his father-in-law[x]. This favoured treatment, however, did not extend to promotion. He was promoted substantive Captain to take effect from December 7, 1852 and when the War broke out in 1861 he was a Major in a staff posting within the Paymasters Department.

LONGSTREET AND THE CIVIL WAR (1861 – 1865)

After resigning from the Old Army on May 9, 1861, Longstreet was commissioned as a brigadier general in the Provisional Army of the Confederate States with the effective date of June 17, 1861. He commanded a brigade with distinction at Blackburn's Ford (July 18) and at First Manassas (July 21). His outstanding performance in these battles led to his being promoted to the rank of major general at the beginning of October 1861 and given a division which he commanded effectively during the early part of the Peninsular Campaign in the spring of 1862.

At the Battle of Seven Pines[xi] (May 31 – June 1, 1862) Longstreet had command of the Confederate "Wing"[xii], but performed poorly and for a time reverted to commanding a division. When Lee assumed command of the Confederate forces after Johnston was severely wounded, however, Longstreet was given a command totalling 15 brigades and redeemed his reputation as a battlefield commander during the Seven Days Battles (June 25 – July 1,1862).

When the Army of Northern Virginia was established in the summer of 1862, Longstreet was given command of its "Right Wing" comprising five divisions and this formation became the First Corps from November 6, 1862. Longstreet was not only a corps commander but, also, second-in-command of Lee's Army of Northern Virginia, and in this dual role was to continue to have Lee's confidence until the end of the War.

Longstreet's ideas on strategy were quite innovative for his time but were deficient somewhat in his consideration of logistical factors – the bane of all Confederate strategy! His view on the conduct of operations involved the combining of the **operational offensive with the tactical defensive.**

In practice, this meant:

- fighting on the ground of your own choosing; and
- attacking after enemy attacks have been defeated.

He was able to successfully adapt this notion for the conduct of the battle to various situations. At Second Manassas, his flanking attack had disastrous effects on Pope's Army of Virginia after Pope's forces had spent the previous two days engaging Jackson. At Sharpsburg (Antietam), two weeks later, his corps held the southern flank of Lee's line in a good defensive position and stalled Burnside's afternoon attack across Antietam Creek[xiii].

The decisive Confederate victory at Fredericksburg in December 1862 confirmed in Longstreet's mind the value of his defensive approach to warfare, particularly when the additional factor of field fortifications was included with the defensive firepower of the Civil War weaponry and the use of the terrain to its best advantage. The casualties sustained by Longstreet's forces were half those of Jackson and certainly many fewer than Burnside's Union forces. Furthermore, the Confederate casualties at the Battle of Fredericksburg were in sharp contrast to the carnage at Antietam three months earlier. This comparison was not lost on Longstreet and significantly influenced his thinking on the future conduct of the War. Although Lee and Longstreet continued to discuss at length the worth of tactical defensive approach to the conduct of the War, it was the Battle of Fredericksburg that convinced Longstreet that the defensive battle was the only way the Confederacy could win the War. This, then, set the scene for the differences between them on how best the War should progress, a difference that would climax six months later at Gettysburg.

Lee's stunning victory at Chancellorsville in May 1863 provided a second opportunity to carry the War into Northern territory and Lee's Pennsylvania Campaign began at the beginning of June. Longstreet believed at this time that he had convinced Lee to combine his strategic offensive with defensive tactics. He believed that once the Army of Northern Virginia was in enemy territory, the Federals would be forced to attack them. With careful selection of ground, possibly across the Federal's lines of communication, Lee might then be able to win a victory like Fredericksburg[xiv].

When the Confederate and Union forces met on July 1, 1863, west of Gettysburg there was not the opportunity for the Confederates to choose the ground to do battle. Without JEB Stuart's cavalry to screen his forces and provide the necessary reconnaissance to locate the enemy, the Confederate forces:

> *"…stumbled into a battle Lee neither expected or wanted"*[xv].

Nevertheless, on that first day of the battle, his infantry and artillery were able to rout two Union corps and by the end of the day they had a tactical advantage to the extent that Lee believed rendered inappropriate the "Longstreet doctrine" of tactical defence. In his report of the battle, Lee noted that the battle:

> *"… thus became, in a measure, unavoidable. Encouraged by the successful issue of the engagement of the first day, and in view of the valuable results that would ensure from the defeat of the army of General Meade, it was thought advisable to renew the attack"*

In the wake of the Confederate success on July 1, Longstreet met with Lee and proposed their forces go around the Union left flank and position themselves on ground of their own choosing between the Meade's army and Washington, thus forcing the Union forces to attack them. Lee rejected this suggestion and proposed the attack on the Union's left flank the next day and the

attack on the Union's centre the following day, the now famous "Pickett's Charge". With the wisdom hindsight gives us, we know that Lee's plans would fail and that his orders represented one of his most serious errors as a commander.

The key question that needs to be addressed, however, is – should Lee have accepted Longstreet's advice at Gettysburg? Again, with the wisdom of hindsight, the answer is 'yes', but only with regard to not attacking the Union forces defending the high ground east of the town. Longstreet's proposal to move around the Federal army and interpose the Army of Northern Virginia between Meade and Washington, DC., was not a viable option given the lack of intelligence available on the Federals' disposition and movements. It is generally agreed that Lee's rejection of Longstreet's defensive tactics approach at Gettysburg created considerable strains in the relationship between the two men. Although Longstreet acceded to his commander's orders, he allowed his displeasure to affect his conduct. The features of his performance in earlier battles – careful planning, up-to-date intelligence and attention to detail – were missing. For this he deserves censure. Furthermore, given Meade's planning for the Pipe Creek Line[xvi], albeit hurried, there was another position for the Union forces to use with effect had Longstreet's proposal been adopted. It is regrettable that Longstreet presented only one option to Lee who, in circumstances where there was little or no intelligence information available to him, really had no alternative but to reject the proposal.

The blame that Longstreet was to receive after the War for the Confederate defeat at Gettysburg is discussed in a later part of this paper. Suffice to say at this point that General George Pickett, CSA, was somewhere near the truth when he said that the Yankees had something to do with it!

In September 1863, Longstreet, together with his First Corps, was transferred to reinforce Braxton Bragg's Army of Tennessee to retrieve the deteriorating situation in Tennessee. He arrived when the Battle of Chickamauga was being fought and was immediately tasked by Bragg to command the left "wing" of the Confederate forces comprising 23 000 troops in 17 brigades organised into six divisions. The manner in which Bragg had assigned formations/units to the order of battle of the two "wings" of his army lacked a sound rationale and tested the capabilities of Longstreet and his staff to the limit. Although Longstreet's wing contained two corps, Hood's and Buckner's, Buckner's two divisions were on opposite ends of the line. Furthermore, a significant part of the force had been involved in the heavy fighting the previous day[xvii] and had lost a large number of field grade officers[xviii]. This was particularly critical in given that Bragg's plan was to renew the offensive at first light on the next day.

The planned early morning attack by Bragg's army, which was to begin on the far right of Polk's wing and be taken up *en echelon* by division to the south, was delayed until 9:30 am. Whilst this delay gave Longstreet the opportunity to refine the dispositions of his command, it also afforded Bragg the opportunity to panic – which he did! Among other things he sent orders for Stewart's division (part of Hood's Corps) on the right flank of Longstreet's wing to attack without informing Longstreet. When Hood commenced his attack on Longstreet's orders, Stewart was already retreating to the original "start line" having come under heavy enfilade fire from Federal forces.

At the same time as Hood's corps started their attack, a gap in the Federal lines opened up and was exploited by the Confederate infantry who then attacked the flanks of the Union forces on each side of the gap and threatened directly Rosecran's headquarters. George Thomas who, already severely challenged on his front by Polk's forces, was able to adjust his defences to meet Longstreet's attack from the south on his flank averted a complete rout. As with many of

their offensive operations, the Confederate momentum slowed, being affected by fatigue, casualties and confusion resulting from the diminution of command and control. In the mid-afternoon Longstreet met with Bragg and requested additional troops from Polk's wing to allow him to continue the battle but Bragg declined this request.

By evening Thomas was able to effect an orderly withdrawal to the north to join the rest of the Army of the Cumberland in its move to Chattanooga. Although Bragg's Confederate forces had driven the Union forces from the battlefield, mainly through the efforts of Longstreet's wing, it was a pyrrhic victory, with 18 454 casualties over the two days of the battle – men the South could not afford to lose. It was, however, the only victory the Army of Tennessee was to have in the War!

After Chickamauga, Longstreet became the leader of a group of senior officers seeking to have Bragg relieved of his command of the Army of Tennessee. Longstreet's role in this petty bickering was less than honourable and bordered on the mutinous. His open criticism of Bragg fuelled rumours that he was soon to replace Bragg and necessitated President Davis coming to meet with them to resolve the matter. Davis proposed that Longstreet be given an independent command and conduct a campaign in East Tennessee to which both Longstreet and Bragg agreed but obviously for different reasons.

From the outset the East Tennessee Campaign was a disaster and the winter campaign of 1863-1864 represents a low point in Longstreet's career as an army commander. Supplies were scarce during much of the campaign and Longstreet underestimated the strength of his forces required to capture Knoxville and was not able, therefore, to mount a major campaign for this purpose. He mounted a half-hearted attack on Fort Sanders, an attack that probably should not have been made at all. For much of his time he was absorbed with internal squabbles with his subordinate officers and his treatment of some of his subordinates was extremely harsh and unfair.

Longstreet's critics often hold this period of the East Tennessee Campaign as evidence of his incompetence. Such a selective use of evidence is somewhat unfair and it is necessary to consider the totality of his record for a sound judgment to be made. In this regard, his performance at Chickamauga must provide some balance to any claims of incompetence. Nevertheless, this poor performance with independent command should not be dismissed or treated as being of little significance in judging Longstreet's record.

In April 1864, Longstreet with his First Corps rejoined the Army of Northern Virginia and was warmly welcomed by Lee and his staff. Longstreet's service with Lee was cut short when, on May 6 during the Battle of the Wilderness, he was seriously wounded in a "friendly fire' incident with a 'minie' round to his throat. He returned to duty with Lee in October 1864 with his once clear voice affected and his right arm paralysed, offering to serve in any capacity because of his physical disability. Lee's reaction to this offer was to restore him immediately to command the First Corps where he would continue until the surrender in April 1865.

At the time of his return to duty in October 1864, the Army of Northern Virginia was in a defensive position south of Richmond protecting the important railway connections around Petersburg. Lee had welcomed him back unconditionally and in the latter days of the War relied more and more on his "Old Warhorse". Longstreet's aide, wrote to his family at this time saying:

> *"… It is gratifying to Genl. L. to know that though he is no favourite with the President & Bragg, yet he has what is much better, the unbounded confidence of Genl. Lee, and the officers and troops in his command"*

In February 1865, with the War coming to its inevitable end, Lee[xix] wrote to Longstreet to thank him for his "earnestness and zeal" towards his operations and stating:

> *"… were our whole population animated with the same spirit we would be invulnerable"*

In the light of developments after the War with the "anti-Longstreet cabal", it is worth noting that prior to the surrender, Pendleton[xx] came to Longstreet asking him to convey to Lee the views of a group of senior officers that they should surrender. This group, of which Pendleton was the spokesman, recognised the special friendship of Lee and Longstreet and that as Lee's second-in-command the suggestion would be better received if it were to come from Longstreet. Longstreet refused, citing the Confederate Articles of War that equated talk of surrender to treason and added:

> *"If General Lee doesn't know when to surrender until I tell him, he will never know"*

Nevertheless, with Longstreet's assurance that Grant would not seek to deliberately humiliate him, Lee met with Grant on April 9 to arrange the surrender. Longstreet then headed the commission that was to work through the detail of the surrender for the Confederates but, like Lee, he did not participate in the official surrender ceremony that was held on April 12. Longstreet and Lee parted company on that day on good terms with Longstreet planning to travel south to visit relatives and then to travel with Goree (his aide) to Texas.

SOME OBSERVATIONS OF LONGSTREET'S CIVIL WAR RECORD

It is worthwhile now, to review Longstreet's performance throughout the War, and to highlight not only the strengths that made him the outstanding commander he was but, also, identify his weaknesses and faults, both real and perceived, that served as the basis of the later criticism and the campaign to blacken his reputation.

There is no doubt that James Longstreet had a significant influence on the strategy and tactics that emerged during the American Civil War. In contrast to commanders on both sides, he had an enlightened grasp of the need for changes to strategy to accommodate the weaponry that was being developed around the middle of the 19th century. In particular, he recognised the need for a different Confederate strategy to avoid the pyrrhic victories that inevitably would destroy the Confederacy. His combining of the strategic offensive with the tactical defensive, as evidenced at the Battle of Fredericksburg, provides an excellent example of the application of the type of warfare most appropriate for the conditions that the Confederacy faced, particularly with regard to its manpower resources.

Furthermore, the concept of fortified field defences that were first used by Longstreet at Fredericksburg and widely used in the sieges of Richmond and Petersburg in the latter stages

of the War, served as a basis for that used in defensive warfare into the 20th century. In this regard, Longstreet was at the leading edge of the development of defensive warfare techniques.

When required to adopt offensive tactics, as he did at Chickamauga, he applied as a principle of war the *'concentration of force'* with devastating effect and in both offensive and defensive operations he recognised the importance of firepower and field defences in determining the outcome of the battle.

In contrast to other commanders on both sides, Longstreet made very effective use of his staff officers. Whilst in other commands the staff were little more than glorified couriers, Sorrell, in particular, fulfilled a role of the modern day 'Chief of Staff'. To achieve this it would have been necessary for Longstreet to communicate his orders to his staff in a clear and unambiguous manner[xxi] thus allowing them to communicate his intentions to subordinate commanders, as the occasion required.

Importantly, Longstreet grew in the job. In contrast to other officers whose performance did not improve over the period of the War, Longstreet learned from his initial mistakes. The Longstreet who commanded at Chickamauga (1863) and the Wilderness (1864) was much better than was the Longstreet at Seven Pines in 1862. By 1864, Longstreet was the outstanding corps commander of the Confederacy and certainly as good as any of the corps commanders on the Union side.

Longstreet's tenure in independent commands met with mixed success. Whilst the Suffolk Campaign (1862) is regarded by most as a success, the East Tennessee campaign conducted after Chickamauga was poorly conducted and involved Longstreet in personal clashes with his subordinate commanders throughout the campaign for which criticism of him is justified. These problems followed earlier clashes he had with Bragg and the associated criticisms that he was disloyal and insubordinate and he must bear a major responsibility for the lack of unity that the Army of Tennessee so desperately needed.

Longstreet is criticised also for the shabby treatment that he handed out to some of his subordinate officers, notably McLaws, Law and Robertson. Whilst this criticism is valid, it needs to be put in the context of Longstreet being no better or worse than his contemporaries. There are numerous examples[xxii] from both sides, including Grant, Jackson, and Sherman, of allegations of unfair and shabby treatment of subordinate officers.

There is little doubt that James Longstreet was a forceful commander whose level of performance over the four years of the War varied but who, on balance, provided the Confederacy with outstanding service. He appears to have not suffered fools gladly and made a number of enemies amongst senior Confederate officers and this would come back to haunt him in life after the War.

LIFE AFTER THE WAR 1865 –1904

Longstreet's post-war life was to be inexorably bound up with the controversy of his wartime service, particularly in relation to his performance at Gettysburg. In Longstreet, the South was to find a scapegoat that they could use to rationalise the loss of the War. In the minds of those

of the South Longstreet's advocacy for compromise and reconciliation with the "enemy" and, in particular, his joining the Republican Party confirmed his guilt as a traitor to their "Lost Cause".

After the surrender Longstreet started his journey to Texas but only went as far as New Orleans where he settled with his family in a community of Confederate veterans which included Hood and Beauregard. He started a business as a cotton broker in partnership with the Owen brothers, became president of the board of an insurance firm and had interests in railway investments. Within two years his business was successful, he had become a respected figure in financial circles and with his wife mixed with the city's social elite. This situation was to change and Longstreet was to become from 1867 one of the South's most controversial figures.

To understand fully Longstreet's transformation from Civil War hero to villain and scapegoat, it is necessary to understand the emotional turmoil in the South as it sought to come to terms with losing the War. To the deeply religious South, it was necessary to explain the result of the War in terms that did not entail loss of God's grace. Furthermore, it was necessary to devise an explanation that would not question the notion of the superiority of the white Southern civilisation. Thus, the Confederate dead, in particular, Jackson and Stuart, were likened to the Christian martyrs for their sacrifice and undying devotion to the Cause and the living heroes raised to sainthood status. Post-war Southern journalists, commentators and authors engaged in an intensely nostalgic form of writing focusing on the battlefield prowess of its leaders and soldiers making their participation in battle so honourable that it outshone defeat. In addition, the characteristics of the "good old days" of the antebellum South were exaggerated to the extent that it was life in paradise. It became in minds of "true" Southerners "...a superior civilisation of great purity which God, in His mysterious wisdom, had sacrificed to the materialistic Yankees"[xxiii]. Thus, the so-called "Lost Cause Myth" was born and Longstreet would be seen as the South's enemy in it.

Longstreet's "fall from grace" began in March 1867 as a political crisis began to emerge with the passage of the *Military Reconstruction Bills* through Congress. These bills provided for the former Confederate states, except Tennessee, to be divided into five military districts and required each state to adopt a new constitution that provided for black suffrage and ratified the 14th Amendment granting citizenship to black Americans. At this time the editor of the *New Orleans Times* published the names of former prominent Confederates living in the city and invited them to present their views publicly on the Reconstruction legislation. Longstreet was one of the first to respond stating the need for calm and patience to this harsh legislation with a view to there being aneventual opportunity for full restoration of constitutional government in which the South's old order would rise again to its previous leadership role. This pragmatic but moderate approach to the situation found support with a number of Longstreet's Civil War contemporaries and a number of letters with similar sentiments to his were published throughout the South. When he sent a second letter to the New Orleans' press asserting that cooperation would minimise the length of the period of Reconstruction, the *New York Times* printed his comments in full.

In June, Longstreet went a step further when he wrote two letters that were to bring the wrath of the South upon him. The first, which is reproduced in his memoirs, related to the issue of the implementation of Negro suffrage and so incensed the editor that he published an editorial calling Longstreet a traitor to the Southern people and accusing him of deserting his friends and joining the enemy[xxiv]. The second letter, which was published in the *New Orleans Times* on June 8, 1867 and later in other newspapers around the country, created a furore throughout the country and was to seal Longstreet's fate as an enemy of the South. In this letter, Longstreet urged Southerners to work within the Republican Party rather than against it. Whilst his friends

had urged him not submit the letter[xxv] for publication, he held firm to the view that it should be published as it was his "…duty to assist the people". When his friends' dire predictions proved correct, Longstreet was surprised and confused.

The immediate impact on Longstreet was that people he had known for years began to pass him in the street without speaking and his business enterprises began to fail. It was necessary for him to dissolve his cotton brokerage partnership with the Owen brothers to save the business and John Bell Hood took over his insurance interests and, to use his own words "… in a few weeks I found myself at leisure". In addition, Longstreet's family was subject to considerable social ostracism in an attempt to "… freeze them out of white society". One lasting consequence of this ostracism was that Longstreet left the Episcopalian church, the traditional church of military men from both the North and South, to eventually become a Catholic.

It has been suggested[xxvi] that even at this stage, Longstreet's reputation might not have suffered irreparable damage had he not exercised the courage of his convictions and joined the Republican Party. Furthermore, shortly after his last letter was published, Longstreet received a Civil War pardon[xxvii] from the federal government. To the South, Longstreet was seen as not only going over to the "enemy", but also being rewarded for his traitorous act! In the following years, his acceptance of appointments from the Louisiana State Government and the federal government[xxviii], particularly during Grant's administration, reinforced this perception of Longstreet taking the "thirty pieces of silver". Thus, by his own actions, Longstreet gave the South their "Judas" for the "Lost Cause" and set the scene for his becoming the scapegoat for the defeat at Gettysburg and by extension for the War.

Adding to these attacks on his reputation, Longstreet found that his Civil War performance came under attack. Significantly, these attacks, which were orchestrated by a number of Lee's subordinate officers, came only after Lee's death in 1870. Initially, there were two separate groups, one in Richmond headed by Jubal Early and the other in Lexington, led by Rev. William N Pendleton[xxix], each seeking funds to enshrine the memory of Lee. These two groups were soon to join forces and together become a powerful force in Southern history. To achieve the image of a pure and saintly hero for Lee, they built up his reputation by shifting his previously acknowledged faults and failures during the War to Longstreet. The particular focus of their attacks related to Gettysburg. Thus, they were able to convince 19th century Americans and historians for most of the 20th century that Gettysburg was **the** turning point of the whole War, and that the responsibility for defeat lay with James Longstreet.

Before outlining the case put by the "Anti-Longstreet cabal", it is necessary to examine the Civil War careers of Early and Pendleton with a view to understanding more clearly their motivations in mounting the campaign against Longstreet.

Early was a Confederate general whose Civil War career was marked by controversy and failure. His failure, at Gettysburg, to follow up the attacks on Culp Hill and Cemetery Hill on the first day is regarded as a major blunder in the Gettysburg campaign. Towards the end of the War, he was badly defeated whilst commanding II Corps in the Shenandoah Valley and Lee was forced to "sack" him, the only general officer that Lee relieved of command for ineptitude in the whole War. After the War, Early fled to Canada where, living in poverty, he wrote a book defending his conduct of his last campaign only to have Lee withhold approval for its release. In his writings about the War, however, Early was able to gain with the pen, the reputation he failed to win with the sword. Returning to the United States in 1869, he became president of the Association of the Army of Northern Virginia in 1870 and, in the following years, a vice president

of the Southern Historical and Confederate Burial and Memorial Associations. After Lee's death in 1870, Early found himself in a position of considerable influence and power.

Pendleton had been Lee's Chief of Artillery in the Army of Northern Virginia and was, after the War, an Episcopalian minister in Lexington where the Lee family lived. Despite his position as one of Lee's senior staff officers, Pendleton was not close to Lee and after Gettysburg he was relegated to purely administrative role on the headquarters. Pendleton had a reputation of being incompetent and his retention, albeit in a limited role, was often cited as a criticism of Lee. It has been said that he was tortured throughout his life with religious doubts and some of Lee's staff questioned his mental stability. In preserving what he called "…Lee's sacred memory" he found purpose for his life.

J. William Jones completed the triumvirate that was to comprise the cabal. He was a Baptist minister at Lexington where he became a close friend and confidant of the Lee family after the War and gained access to many of Lee's personal papers after his death. With the family's endorsement he was to publish in 1874 *Personal Reminiscences, Anecdotes and Letters of General Robert E Lee,* the first 55 pages of which were simply a verbatim reproduction of Early's speech slandering Longstreet. He constantly deferred to Early and as secretary of the Southern Historical Society and editor of the *Southern Historical Society Papers* took great delight in using the publication to destroy Longstreet's reputation.

The first attack by Early on Longstreet was on January 19, 1872 when he delivered an address commemorating Lee's birthday in Lexington, Virginia.[xxx] In his address, Early claimed that at Gettysburg, Lee had ordered an attack by Longstreet's Corps at dawn on the second day (July 2, 1863) and that, if this attack had been made as planned, Lee would have won the battle and the Confederates the War.

Pendleton continued the attack a year later at Lee's birthday address when he reinforced Early's "sunrise attack" claim by stating that he had undertaken a reconnaissance on the morning of July 2, 1863 because Lee was expecting Longstreet to attack at dawn. Here was confirmation of Early's claim from an apparently impeccable source – a minister of the cloth and a former senior staff officer of Lee. Pendleton went further with his accusations about Longstreet when he claimed that Longstreet's actions on the second day of the battle in not attacking at dawn constituted "culpable disobedience" and "treachery". Furthermore, Lee's acceptance of the blame for the defeat amounted to a magnanimous gesture on Lee's part to cover-up the disaster[xxxi].

At first, Longstreet maintained a dignified silence possibly in the belief that the outright untruths of both Early and Pendleton would be exposed for what they were. This approach was unfortunate for it did not take into account how unpopular Longstreet was and how much the public wanted to believe ill of him. At Longstreet's urging, a number of Lee's staff officers stated in print that the sunrise attack was never ordered by Lee. Furthermore, perusal of Pendleton's 1863 report submitted to Lee after the battle demonstrates clearly that the claims made in his 1873 lecture were a complete fabrication. Piston has summarised the situation in a somewhat blunt but accurate manner in a recently published essay:

> *"Early and Pendleton were unmitigated, wilful liars who hated Longstreet because of his postwar Republican affiliation …their churlish fabrications should not have been credited"*[xxxii]

But credited they were! When Longstreet did respond, his replies were seen as vain, arrogant and egotistical, causing him not to be believed and giving additional credence to the Early/Pendleton version of the story. He made excessive claims for himself and expressed views on Lee that, whilst historically accurate, were most unpopular with his readers. Thus, the Early/Pendleton version became increasingly accepted by the public at large during this later part of the 19th century and the basis on which 20th century historians would record this part of the Civil War and judge James Longstreet's contribution to the Confederate cause.
Longstreet's reputation took a further battering in September 1874 when the Crescent City White League comprising mainly Confederate veterans sought to overthrow the Louisiana State Government by force of arms. Longstreet, who commanded the state militia and the metropolitan police force made up almost entirely of blacks, led a force into a street battle against this white supremacist group. His force was defeated and he was captured. Federal troops were to eventually restore order in the city but Longstreet's reputation was severely damaged and he did not exercise his command again. This incident was widely reported throughout the country and was crucial in the continuing success of the Anti-Longstreet cabal in changing the historical record of the Civil War over the years.

Supporting Early and Pendleton in their systematic campaign of blackening Longstreet's reputation was the Rev J William Jones who, in his capacity as editor of the *Southern Historical Society Papers* used this publication as the primary means of attacking Longstreet. Manuscripts were solicited from a wide range of sources but all having a common motivation to attack Longstreet. These solicited papers were then published along with Longstreet's own responses as the "Gettysburg Series" in the *Southern Historical Society Papers* in 1878. Writing in this series, Early repeated his "sunrise attack" charges and now claimed that Lee had expected Longstreet to send Hood's and McLaw's divisions forward as part of "Pickett's Charge" on the third day of Gettysburg. Longstreet's responses were included in the "Gettysburg Series" without his permission and, appearing with the solicited papers from many of his former army associates, gave the appearance of his being given a fair and objective airing of the issues. Scrutiny of this so-called evidence, however, shows that it comprised only unsubstantiated accusations and innuendo.

The attacks on Longstreet continued through the 1880s helped in large measure by Longstreet himself whose writings increasingly displayed a jealousy of Jackson and belittling of Lee's strategic vision. Most significantly, *the Southern Historical Society Papers* became increasingly a primary source that a new generation of historians would use in analysing the Civil War, its battles and its commanders. Thus, the inaccuracies stemming from the lies promulgated by the Early/Pendleton/Jones cabal would become part of historical record of the Civil War. A stark example of this is provided by the fact that Douglas Southall Freeman, the noted American historian who wrote what is regarded as the definitive four-volume biography of Lee in the 1930s used the *Papers* as a primary source for his research on the Lee/Longstreet controversy at Gettysburg. As Piston points out:

> *"… In thirty-eight years of research Freeman never uncovered a single wartime document which reflected negatively on Longstreet's relationship with Lee; his criticism of Longstreet was based exclusively upon the postwar writings of Longstreet's avowed enemies… (Freeman) set the seal of professional scholarship on Jubal Early's long campaign of character assassination. …Subsequent historians, noting Freeman's massive bibliography of primary source materials and the thousands of foot notes which meticulously documented his thousands of pages, accepted*

Freeman's conclusions without questioning the sources he used in relation to Longstreet"[xxxiii]

In fairness to Freeman, however, it should be noted that he was from a time when, because of the success of the campaign of vilification of Longstreet, this view was part of the accepted cultural norms.

During the period of the vilification of his reputation by Early et al, Longstreet's Republican Party affiliations provided a number of government positions that allowed him to provide well for his family. In addition to the appointments indicated earlier in this paper, other appointments were to include:

- From mid-1873, a four-year appointment as president of the Levee Commission of Engineers with an annual salary of $6000;
- Deputy Collector of Internal Revenue in Georgia (1878);
- Postmaster for Gainesville, Georgia (1879);
- US Minister (Ambassador) for Turkey (1880); and
- From 1881, a four-year appointment as United States Marshall for Georgia.

His tenure as United States Marshall for Georgia was plagued with controversy and political intrigue. His predecessor had left office "under a cloud" and Longstreet ordered an audit of the books that resulted in a full government investigation. Although Longstreet's personal integrity was noted, his competence to manage an office was queried. Longstreet had to defend himself and his son Garland whom he had appointed as Chief Deputy Marshal, before a House committee. It was alleged that Garland actually ran the office and the General was just a figurehead. The Democrats used this alleged misconduct as an election issue in the 1884 presidential campaign. With the Democrats winning the election and being in the Oval Office for the first time in 24 years Longstreet's tenure as US Marshal was over and he certainly would not be receiving any further government appointments under a Democrat administration. He had served three years of his four-year appointment.

He went into semi-retirement in Gainesville where he operated the Piedmont Hotel where the family spent the winter months. Increasingly, he found pleasure working on his farm where he raised turkeys, planted an orchard and looked after the grapes in his vineyard. Although his age and war wounds increasingly restricted him in farming, these years were some of the most pleasurable of his life. In 1889, however, disaster struck when his house on the farm was destroyed by fire. All the contents in the house were consumed in the fire including his uniform and sword, a sash given to him by J.E.B. Stuart, his Civil War memorabilia including a pair of spurs he had worn throughout the War and his library. The damage was estimated at around $8000 and he was uninsured. He and his wife, Louise, were forced to move to a small cottage on the farm that he had built previously.

At the end of 1889, Louise died. His wife for over 40 years she had shared his burden and followed him as a soldier's wife wherever his duty led him. Longstreet buried her in Alta Vista cemetery in Gainesville. Following Louise's death Longstreet immersed himself in the writing of his memoirs, a task that now had to be started all over again because of the fire in April 1889 had consumed all his notes and books. To him, these memoirs were the culmination of a struggle in the print media of the day and in private correspondence spanning more than 20

years. It was a fight that he had been losing but saw that in these memoirs the opportunity to consider:

> *"… some misrepresentations of my battles that I wish to correct, so as to have my record correct before I die"*[xxxiv]

The memoirs were finally published in early 1896, a 690-page work titled *From Manassas to Appomattox,* which, as might be expected, received both praise and censure. His criticisms of Lee were widely condemned and some of the reviews of the book suggested that in some parts of the book his objectivity was questionable. Despite these shortcomings, the book was received well and was reprinted in 1908.

To the dismay and embarrassment of his children, Longstreet married a woman over 40 years younger than him in September 1897. She was Helen Dortch, a 34 year old Georgian, who was working as assistant state librarian at the time of their marriage. Although the new Mrs Longstreet and the General's children were said not to have cared for each other, she was a devoted wife and became his most ardent defender after his death in 1904. Helen Longstreet[xxxv] was to outlive her husband by some 58 years and died, in 1962, aged 99 years.

As a result of the win in the presidential election by the Union veteran and Republican William McKinley, Longstreet secured the appointment of United States Commissioner of Railroads. It was a choice appointment requiring only nominal inspection duties. Even in this position his past came back to haunt him when his predecessor, Wade Hampton, the former Confederate cavalry officer and bitter enemy in the postwar years, sought to have the appointment overturned and when this failed refused to assist during the transition of administrations.

Although his health was failing he attended army reunions as often as possible and went with Edward Porter Alexander to West Point for its 100th anniversary. It was there sitting outside on the porch of the old hotel, he saw Joseph Wheeler, one of his former cavalry officers who had served in the Spanish-American War in 1898, dressed in the blue general's uniform. Longstreet was alleged to remark:

> *"…I hope that Almighty God takes me before He does you, for I want to be within gates of hell to hear Jubal Early cuss you in your blue uniform"*[xxxvi]

Even after all the vilification he had to endure from Early et al, Longstreet could still retain some sense of humour.

During the summer of 1903, Longstreet became seriously ill and in the autumn he travelled to Chicago for X-ray treatment on a cancerous right eye. His weight had dropped from 91kg to 61kg[xxxvii]. By Christmas, he and wife, Helen, had returned to Gainesville and on January 2, 1904 his old throat wound from the Wilderness campaign began to haemorrhage badly. At around 5 pm on that day with his wife and three of his children by his side, the "Old Warhorse" died.

A RE-ASSESSMENT OF LONGSTREET?

The success of the scurrilous Early/Pendleton/Jones campaign to destroy Longstreet's reputation was to taint Civil War historiography for over a century. The "Anti- Longstreet cabal" may have been "…unmitigated, wilful liars" but they were good at it!

Only in recent times have the biases been identified in the widely used documents, dating from the 1870s, that had served as the primary sources for Civil War history, biography and popular fiction. Other sources have also been examined more recently. This has resulted in a critical examination and rejection of the "Lost Cause" thesis and ongoing re-assessment of the Lee/Longstreet relationship. There has been, also, a re-thinking of the popular view that Gettysburg was the single turning point of the War and that the Confederate defeat in this battle was the reason for the South losing the War.

Whilst there is no a consensus amongst today's historians, the former image of Longstreet as the villain of the South is changing. Along side the previously accepted image of Longstreet as the slow, pedestrian and stubborn commander an image of his being competent, wise, compassionate and, above all, the trusted friend and adviser to Lee is emerging.

The well argued case based on solid research of primary sources by William G Piston (1987) and the more recent biography by Jeffry D Wert (1993), present a much more positive and balanced image of Longstreet than those of earlier times. Nevertheless, other works still use Longstreet's failures in a selective manner to demonstrate his alleged overall incompetence and, in particular, replicate Freeman's error of citing the writings of Early *et al* that have been now so thoroughly discredited[xxxviii]. It is likely that history scholars will continue to be divided in their views of Longstreet's place in Civil War and Reconstruction history. Such is the very nature of their subject.

In the more general forum of public opinion, however, there have been a number of diverse initiatives that may be regarded as catalysts in a major change to Longstreet's image. The first of these, was the publication, in 1974, of Michael Shaara's novel *Killer Angels,* a fictionalised account of Gettysburg, which presented Longstreet in a most positive way and certainly quite differently to the way that he had been traditionally perceived. Despite winning the Pulitzer Prize, Shaara's novel did not reach a sufficiently wide audience to effect a change to Longstreet's popular image until it was picked up and made into the movie *Gettysburg* in 1993. This motion picture of over four hours, while containing a number of historical inaccuracies - some of the accents and false beards bordered on the ludicrous - faithfully captured Shaara's image of Longstreet free from the vicious campaign of lies that had plagued him during his lifetime. Seen by millions, *Gettysburg* has done more than anything else to raise people's awareness about Civil War issues and has done more than anything else to alter the perceptions relating to Longstreet's image.

On June 1, 1991, the North Carolina Division of the Sons of Confederate Veterans established the Longstreet Memorial Fund with the goal of placing an equestrian monument of Longstreet within the Gettysburg National Battlefield Park. Significantly, almost all of the funds raised for this monument came from private sources, mainly in small amounts. Thus, the raising of the first permanent memorial of Longstreet came from the grassroots level of American society. The memorial was unveiled on July 3, 1998, the 135th anniversary of the famous battle. At about the same time that Robert C Thomas initiated the Longstreet Memorial Fund, the National Sons of

Confederate Veterans unanimously adopted a resolution "…absolving General Longstreet of any blame for the loss of the Battle of Gettysburg" and pledged support for the monument project. In 1994, Garland Reynolds and others, established the Longstreet Society in Gainesville, the General's hometown. The Society is working to restore what remains of the Piedmont Hotel with a view establishing in it a museum focusing on the General's postwar career.

All of these initiatives are contributing to the effort to change the image of James Longstreet the Confederate general whose military record was severely damaged after the War by self-serving scoundrels who did not agree with his politics.

A FINAL WORD

In April 1875, Longstreet wrote to Pendleton stating his belief that the truth would overcome the attacks that were being made on his reputation:

> *"… It is my opinion that your abuse, so far from impairing my interests or my reputation, will be more likely to enhance them in the estimation of honourable men"*

How wrong he was to be about this and how naïve this statement appeared to be in the light of subsequent events during his lifetime. The developments in recent times might suggest, however, that eventually this belief will be realised and that his tarnished image could well disappear. It will have been a long time coming!

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NOTES

[i] Piston W.G., ***Lee's Tarnished Lieutenant.*** Athens, Georgia: The University of Georgia Press, 1987.

[ii] It should be noted that the Army of Northern Virginia was not formally established until the summer of 1862. Longstreet's service with the forces that were to become the Army of Northern Virginia commenced with his receiving a commission as Brigadier General in the Provisional Army of the Confederate States on June 17, 1861.

[iii] His operations here were, on balance, a failure. He was unable to capture Knoxville from the Union forces commanded by Burnside although it must be said that the Federal forces greatly outnumbered those of Longstreet.

[iv] Towards dusk on May 6, 1864, Longstreet found himself caught between converging lines of Confederate troops involved in a flanking counterattack and was seriously wounded by men from Mahone's Brigade. This incident was reminiscent of that what cost Jackson his life almost exactly one year before in the same area.

[v] This is a quote taken from Longstreet's memoirs, ***From Manassas to Appomattox,*** Chapter 1, "The Antebellum Life of the Author".

[vi] Longstreet in his memoirs asserts that he was 60th out of the 62 in the graduating class. Whatever the accurate statistic is, he was ranked third last in the class.

[vii] Prospects for advancement and promotion in Infantry were not good except in time of war. Nevertheless, mixing with the common foot soldier that was a consequence of his allocation to Infantry certainly suited Longstreet.

[viii] In this regard, Longstreet was paid the compliment of being addressed as 'Major' but still retained the pay of a lieutenant.

[ix] Longstreet was to lose three of his children, Augustus, James and Mary Anne in the scarlett fever epidemic in Richmond in September 1862.

[x] A comprehensive review of Longstreet's service during this pre-war period and the influence of his father-in-law in his postings is provided in the chapter titled **"Petticoats, Promotions and Military Assignments"** in the book, ***James Longstreet – The Man, the Soldier, the Controversy*** edited by R L DiNardo and A A Nofi. (See References).

[xi] Known as the Battle of Fair Oaks by the Federals.

[xii] Essentially this was a corps, although 'corps' was not used as part of the Confederate force structure until later in 1862.

[xiii] Helped, of course, by the timely arrival of A P Hill's troops from Harper's Ferry who attacked Burnside's flank and rear.

[xiv] It is important to note that Lee envisioned the Pennsylvania Campaign essentially as a foraging raid and an attempt to force Union forces out of Virginia in pursuit of him. He was not seeking a climactic battle to end the War.

[xv] See the Chapter by Wert titled **'No Fifteen Thousand Men Can Take That Position"** in DiNardo, R,L. and Nofi, A.A., ***James Longstreet – The Man, the Soldier, the Controversy:*** Conshohocken, Pa. Combined Publishing, 1998. p 83.

[xvi] This was a 20-mile long row of hills on the southern side of Big Pipe Creek approximately 16 miles south of Gettysburg.

[xvii] Of the 17 brigades comprising Longstreet's wing, 9 had been heavily engaged in the previous day's battle another one to a lesser extent.

[xviii] In this regard, captains would command three of the four regiments in one brigade (Robertson's). In one of the other brigades (Benning's), two of the four regimental commanders had been killed and in another (Gregg's), two of the regimental commanders had been wounded and would not take part in the battle on the next day.

[xix] At the end of February 1865, Lee, in confidential correspondence to Longstreet, admitted that little could be done to prevent collapse. Nevertheless, both men retained their determination until the end.

[xx] Pendleton had retained his position as Chief of Artillery under Lee after Gettysburg, but had been relegated to a purely administrative role for the last two years of the War.

[xxi] Contrast this with the lack of information and vague orders that Jackson provided as a matter of course. It should be noted, also, that Jackson used his staff mainly as messengers.

[xxii] Braxton Bragg would probably take the prize for the most such complaints against him with most of his subordinate officers being affected by his harsh and unfair treatment.

[xxiii] Piston W.G., ***Lee's Tarnished Lieutenant – James Longstreet and His Place in Southern History:*** Athens, Ga., The University of Georgia Press, 1987. p 112.

[xxiv] In fact, Longstreet's original letter was not published in the paper and the only record of it is in Longstreet's memoirs.

[xxv] In this regard, his business partner, William Owen, said his view would be misconstrued as self seeking, his friend John Bell Hood said "…they will crucify you" and Augustus Longstreet, his uncle and former guardian predicted "…it will ruin you, son, if you publish it".

[xxvi] See Piston W.G., *op cit,* p 108.

[xxvii] More correctly this was an amnesty, which had been refused previously in November 1865 by President Johnson even after strong representations from Grant. During the next session of Congress, however, General Pope had sent a list of names of men from Georgia seeking amnesty for them. To this list Grant added Longstreet's name. The wheels of government ground slowly and it was not until June 1867 that the amnesty was received. The timing of the receipt of the amnesty was a coincidence but fanned the paranoia of the "Lost Cause" advocates in the South.

[xxviii] In 1869, Longstreet accepted the position of Surveyor of the Port of New Orleans at a salary of $60000 p.a. In 1870, he was appointed as Louisiana's Adjutant General. He received a commission as Brigadier General in the state militia (1872), with responsibility for the command of the militia, police and all civil forces within New Orleans. In 1870, he was named president of the newly organised New Orleans and Northwestern Railroad with an annual salary of $3000.

[xxix] In this campaign against Longstreet, Rev John William Jones, a Baptist minister and former Chaplain of 13th Virginia infantry assisted Pendleton. Early, Pendleton and Jones were to become the cabal that set about enshrining Lee by destroying Longstreet.

[xxx] This address was given at Washington and Lee College where Lee had been president after the War until his death in 1870.

[xxxi] The assertion that a person of integrity like Lee would initiate such a cover-up is extremely problematic, particularly given the saint-like image they were now portraying for him. Pendleton's logic appears to be on a par with his honesty!

[xxxii] See the chapter by Piston titled **'Marked in Bronze'** in DiNardo, R.L. and Nofi, A.A. ***James Longstreet–The Man, the Soldier, the Controversy:*** Conshohocken, Pa. Combined Publishing, 1998. p 205

[xxxiii] DiNardo, R.L. and Nofi, A.A., *op cit,* p 217.

[xxxiv] Wert J.D., ***General James Longstreet – The Confederacy's Most Controversial Soldier,*** New York: Simon and Schuster, 1993, p 421.

[xxxv] The new Mrs Longstreet was a truly remarkable woman. She wrote two books about Longstreet. Only one of them is generally available (it is currently out of print). During World War II Helen Longstreet, then in her early 80s worked in the Bell Bomber Plant in Georgia building B29s. After the war she remained active and even ran for governor. She died aged 99 in the state hospital in Milledgeville.

[xxxvi] Wert J.D., *op cit,* p 426.

[xxxvii] For those not familiar with the metric measures, this is a drop in weight from 200lbs to 135lbs or from over 14 stone to less than 10 stone.

[xxxviii] See, for example, the book – ***Robert E Lee: A Biography,*** written by Emory M Thomas (1995).