

**AMERICAN CIVIL WAR ROUND TABLE OF AUSTRALIA  
(NEW SOUTH WALES CHAPTER)**



**PATRICK R CLEBURNE**  
**“Stonewall Jackson of the West”**  
**HIS CIVIL WAR**

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## INTRODUCTION

Major General Patrick R Cleburne was arguably the best divisional commander on either side of America's Civil War conflict. Described as the "Stonewall Jackson of the West", Cleburne was involved as a brigade and then divisional commander in many of the major battles in the Western Theatre of Operations from Shiloh in 1862 until his untimely death in Hood's disastrous Battle of Franklin in 1864. Lieutenant General William Hardee, one of his corps commanders, succinctly summarised Cleburne's performance in battle in the following terms:

*"Friends and foe soon learned to watch the course of the blue flag that marked where Cleburne was in the battle. Where this division defended no odds broke it's (sic) lines, where it attacked, no numbers resisted it's (sic) onslaught, save only once, and there's the grave of Cleburne and his heroic division."*

In this paper, the assertion that Cleburne was "...the best divisional commander on either side..." is tested. This involved consideration not only of his performance in the major Civil War battles in which he was a formation commander, but, also, his earlier life that had played such an important role in moulding his determination to succeed in whatever he undertook.

## CLEBURNE'S EARLY YEARS

It is important, initially, to review the major events in Cleburne's life prior to the Civil War as they played such an important part in moulding his personality, and are essential to establishing a proper understanding of the many and varied aspects of his character.

**Patrick Ronayne Cleburne** was born on March 16, 1828 in Ovens, a small rural town in County Cork, Ireland. He was the second son of Joseph Cleburne, the only physician in the area, who belonged to the established Church of Ireland. Patrick grew up in comfortable middle class surroundings, but it is said that this family was sympathetic to the lot of the downtrodden and disenfranchised populace. When his mother died when he was about eighteen months old, his father remarried shortly after and Patrick became very attached to his stepmother. He attended a nearby Protestant school at age twelve, but when his father died three years later, was forced to leave school.

He then became an apprentice with Dr T H Justice, a colleague of his late father, in Mallow Town, some twenty miles north of Cork. He worked hard and was a quick learner and Dr Justice entrusted him with the mixing of most medicines. Patrick aspired to a career in this field and made several formal applications for admission to the Apothecaries Hall in Dublin but was rejected on each occasion.

At this time, Ireland was stricken with the potato blight and famine was widespread. With few options open to him, Cleburne travelled to Dublin to convince the masters of the Hall that his years of practical training and experience qualified him for admission. His experience was insufficient, however, to compensate for his inability to read Latin. Knowing his family could not support him, he decided to join the army.

Cleburne spent three and a half years in the British 41<sup>st</sup> Regiment of Foot. At first he thought that his enlistment would take him to India, but he was soon disappointed. In fact because of the famine his regiment remained in Ireland as reinforcement for the local constabulary against the starving populace. A long-time friend of Cleburne later wrote that in the British army he learned to govern himself.

During one of his infrequent visits home, his stepmother advised him of her resolve to move everyone to America. He supported strongly this idea and used the twenty pounds he had inherited as his share of his mother's dowry to buy his way out of the army. Cleburne's ambition for advancement continued to burn but in he was very much aware of the barriers in Ireland to advancement of young apprentices who could not read Latin and to promotion to officer rank from the enlisted men of the British Army.

In retrospect here was a man born to a dominant class of Protestants in a land peopled by poor Catholics. He had the advantage of a formal education cut short at fifteen by his father's death. It made him ambitious for financial and social advancement and would make him comfortable in leadership roles despite personal shyness. He looked forward to making his mark in America.

Cleburne first found work in a drugstore in Cincinnati Ohio, performing most of the work he had learned as an apprentice in Mallow. However before long he had taken a position as a druggist in Helena Arkansas, a small town on the Mississippi. In December 1851 he bought a half-share in the business which went from strength to strength.

He now began to advance socially but was still painfully shy in mixed company. He was a thorough gentleman with ladies but no romantic attachments followed. He was more successful in other social pursuits. He joined the literary club, the town's debating society, exchanging views with lawyers and politicians. He sought membership in the Masonic Lodge, becoming its grandmaster in 1853 at the age of 25. In this position he began to make his mark as a public speaker.

In April 1854 he sold his interest in the firm for \$3000. He planned to use this money to live off while he studied law to gain admission to the bar. This took place in January 1856.

He became involved in the political conflicts of the day, joining forces with a fellow lawyer Thomas Hindman who later became, like Cleburne, a general in the Confederate Army. On one occasion Hindman asked Cleburne to arm himself as he expected trouble from a former Democrat who had switched to the Know Nothing Party. Conflict broke out on the street and Hindman, Cleburne and another fell to the ground badly wounded. Cleburne, in helping his friend, killed the other man but was lucky himself to survive after several weeks in danger.

He did not have strong political ambitions himself, and in 1857 returned to the practice of law and did very well out of land speculation and railroad promotion. In 1860 Cleburne, with the threat of war imminent, wrote to his brother Robert: "... my own opinion is that the first blood shed on Southern soil in a collision between the Federal troops and the State authorities of any Southern state will be the signal for civil war." He hoped that the Union could be preserved but only if the federal government would grant to the South her constitutional rights.

If it came to war he had only one course to follow. He was committed to Arkansas. After ten years in Helena he had become as much an Arkansas man than an Irishman or an American. To his brother Robert he explained:

*"...these people have been my friends and have stood up for me on all occasions. I am with Arkansas in weal or woe."*

On the eve of the war in 1861 he wrote:

*"Life has always been a small matter with me when duty points the way."*

These words would become synonymous with his conduct over the years of the War until his untimely death in 1864.

Before the presidential election in 1860, Cleburne helped to organise a militia company in Helena called "Yell Rifles". As a mark of social and personal respect as well as acknowledgment of his three and a half years in the British Army, the members of the company elected him as their captain. He was completely at ease issuing commands on the drill field. On May 8, 1861 he was elected colonel of the 1<sup>st</sup> Arkansas Volunteer Infantry. As a regimental commander, Cleburne was a strict disciplinarian but he believed that a commander was not only responsible **for** his command but responsible **to** it as well.

## CLEBURNE'S CIVIL WAR SERVICE

In October 1861, General Hardee appointed Cleburne a brigade commander in the Army of Central Kentucky and on March 4, 1862 Cleburne was advised of his promotion to brigadier general. His commitment to discipline and his rigorous work had brought him promotion but he had not had an opportunity to show his ability as a commander. After a year in uniform he had not yet taken part in a major battle. April 1862 at Shiloh, would correct that.

### Shiloh

Cleburne's brigade was in the vanguard of the Confederate attack. As his men advanced a swamp, formed by the overflow of Shiloh Branch, acted as a wedge dividing the command into unequal halves. The right wing of the brigade after initial success ran into the Ohio regiments of Sherman's Division. They charged the Federals gallantly but were shattered by a storm of artillery and musket fire.

The left wing also ran into strong opposition, but Cleburne urged his troops forward. The Federals gave way as their flank had been exposed and they had to fall back to prevent encirclement. Short of ammunition the attack slowed down, and at dusk General Beauregard ordered the attack to be halted. The following morning at roll call only about 800 out of the 2700 men who had gone into the fight 24 hours earlier were fit for duty. Orders came from Bragg to attack the forces in front, even though Cleburne questioned this. Again he ordered his men to advance but they were repulsed with heavy casualties. At sunset, Hardee ordered him to fall back and retreat to Corinth.

Shiloh was a disaster for the Confederacy and it might also have been for Pat Cleburne as well. Nearly all officers in his brigade above the rank of captain had fallen, and in his first exercise of command in a major battle he had led his men almost to annihilation. Cleburne's great attributes were his commitment, reliability, self-discipline and personal courage, but he appeared to lack a sense of innovation during the battle. However, Hardee in his battle report singled him out for praise:

*"Brigadier General Cleburne conducted his command with persevering valor (sic). No repulse discouraged him; but after many bloody struggles he assembled the remnants of his brigade and was conspicuous for his gallantry to the end of the battle."*

One outstanding aspect of the brigade's efforts was the unflinching response by the troops in making such bloody and costly assaults against Sherman's well placed soldiers. Such was

the respect and admiration the men had for Cleburne. Alas, gallantry, determination and perseverance were not enough.

### **Kentucky Campaign**

In August 1862, Generals Bragg and Kirby Smith moved their separate forces into Kentucky. At Richmond, Kentucky, on August 30, Cleburne faced a Union division under Brigadier General Manson. The Federals mounted a strong attack on Cleburne's right. Cleburne, sensing that the Federals had pulled troops from their centre, organised a counter attack against the Federal centre. At this moment a minie ball pierced his left cheek, smashed two teeth in his lower jaw and exited his open mouth. He stayed on the field long enough, however, to witness the results of the counter attack. The Federals were driven back to Richmond where over 4000 prisoners were taken including General Manson.

While convalescing Cleburne decided to grow a beard which concealed the scar on his left cheek. He rejoined his command towards the end of September and on October 8, went into action near Perryville. Again his brigade broke the federal line, driving the enemy nearly a mile to the rear. During this charge Cleburne's horse was killed and threw him to the ground with a leg wound. However he was up immediately leading the advance on foot, until darkness brought an end to the fighting. To the disappointment of all Bragg ordered a withdrawal, and Cleburne and his men reached Knoxville Tennessee on October 26.

Cleburne received praise from his superiors for his services at Richmond and Perryville. He had matured as a field commander since Shiloh even though his disdain for personal danger was still apparent. His ability to enthuse his men, his eagerness for offensive action, his stubbornness in battle and personal courage were still evident. He proved himself a great leader of men. Would he be a great commander?

### **Murfreesboro**

From Knoxville Bragg's army moved westward to Chattanooga and then by rail north to Murfreesboro in Stone River Valley. In December 1862 Cleburne was promoted to Major General, the only product of Ireland to attain that rank in the Confederate Army. Bragg decided to attack Rosecran's advancing Federals and again from 5 am on December 31, Cleburne's division was in the lead. For almost ten hours the division had pushed the federals, breaking their defensive lines on no less than five occasions. They almost reached the Nashville turnpike but could go no further and retired about a quarter mile to the rear to the cover of the woods. There was little activity on January 1, on Cleburne's front, and in the evening of the 2<sup>nd</sup> he received orders to fall back to the same bivouac they had left forty-eight hours earlier. Despite winning the battle on December 31, the rebels had no tangible gains to show for it. Bragg, after receiving reports that federal reinforcements were moving towards Murfreesboro, decided to retreat to near Tallahoma behind Duck River. The feeling against Bragg was now strong. Bragg in a strange request asked for his senior generals' support. The generals were all but unanimous in advising Bragg that a change in command of the army was necessary. Alas, Bragg did not resign.

### **Chickamauga**

After months of comparative inactivity apart from skirmishing around Liberty Gap, the Federal Army on June 24, 1863 began its advance. Several days later the Federals moved through Hoover's Gap threatening Cleburne's flank and rear. He was ordered to fall back to Tullahoma as they were in danger of being out flanked at this town. Bragg decided to further retreat behind the Elk River and eventually to Chattanooga. Bragg entrusted Cleburne with

covering the various crossings of the Tennessee north east of the city. Hardee was transferred to Mississippi to assist General Joe Johnston there against Grant and Sherman.

Lieutenant General D H Hill arrived in Chattanooga on July 19, assuming command of Hardee's former corps on July 24. Cleburne and Hill appeared to get on well together with Hill relying on Cleburne for advice. Bragg, wrote to Hill on one occasion: "Consult Cleburne. He is cool, full of resources, and ever alive to a success." Rosecrans moved against Chattanooga in mid-August.

On August 26, the Federal troops crossed the Tennessee River west of Chattanooga and by September 1, 40,000 troops were south of the city and threatening the Confederate line of retreat. On September 7, Cleburne led his division southward into Georgia.

Again, the constant squabbling and political posturing racked the Confederate command. Bragg's generals had lost confidence in him making the conduct of an effective campaign unlikely. Cleburne was not a political schemer. His view was that strict discipline, drill and personal commitment to the Cause would result in victory. His men believed that they could not fail to win if they could face the enemy on anything like equal terms.

On September 10, Bragg lost an excellent opportunity to cripple Rosecrans's largest corps at McLemore's Cove through his subordinates' bungling. Bragg had a plan to attack the Federal army on its left flank, cutting it off from Chattanooga. He was concentrating the army and wanted Hill's corps with Cleburne's division to spearhead the attack. On the afternoon of September 19, the division marched eight miles to the point of attack and at 6pm Cleburne issued the order to advance. Again they were successful, breaking through the Federal lines capturing three guns and two regimental standards. Darkness brought the attack to an end and the brigades went into bivouac. General Hill later said:

*"I have never seen troops behave more gallantly than did this noble Division."*

On the morning of September 20, the attack by Cleburne's division resumed on a mile-wide front against the Federals who had a four to one numerical advantage behind concealed breastworks. They got to within 175 yards of the Federal position but could go no further. At 11:00am Cleburne, after suffering staggering losses, fell back. However, because of the ferocity of the attack by Cleburne and Breckenridge, Rosecrans had transferred troops to his left flank.

At this time Longstreet's attack burst through the weakened Federal line into its rear area. Rosecrans and most of the army fled, leaving General George Thomas still commanding forces in Cleburne's front in place. At 5pm after consolidating his lines the division moved forward again hitting the Federals as they began to withdraw. The division took hundreds of prisoners and captured three more guns. Again Bragg failed to take advantage of the victory and did not pursue the broken Federals. For some reason he did not believe that his army had been victorious. Again the men had shed their blood to achieve a tactical victory but had not seen such efforts rewarded because the army failed to follow up its success. Out of the 5000 men in the division, a total of 1743 were listed as killed or wounded – one out of every three. On the afternoon of September 22, Cleburne's men arrived on Missionary Ridge overlooking Chattanooga. The Federals set to fortifying the city and the Confederates had no alternative but to settle down to a siege. The feuding continued among the generals and Cleburne signed a petition addressed to President Davis requesting the president to relieve Bragg of his command. Cleburne was not a schemer but because he thought it the right thing to do had joined with the other generals to have Bragg relieved. President Davis backed Bragg telling him to do whatever was necessary to restore unity among the commanding generals. Bragg, however, had General Polk transferred and General D H Hill

relieved of his command. With Bragg still in charge Cleburne's chances for promotion were not high.

## **Chattanooga**

Shortly after Chickamauga, General Grant was instructed to go to Chattanooga as commander of the Military Division of the Mississippi. He arrived on October 23, replacing Rosecrans with General G H Thomas. Grant proceeded to restore the Army's supply lines and to order Sherman's and Hooker's troops to join the forces around Chattanooga. On November 4, General Longstreet left with 15,000 men to attack the Federal army with General Burnside near Knoxville. General Hardee returned and Cleburne and his division were transferred to his corps.

On November 24, Sherman crossed the Tennessee River, but for some reason delayed his advance until 1:30pm. Meanwhile Cleburne was ordered to move his division to Tunnel Hill. Sherman's actions in the initial stages of the attack were very poor and, in fact, he had mistaken where the attack should have been made. Rather than press on with his full force, against Cleburne's one division, he ordered his men to dig in for the night. Grant believed that Sherman would carry Tunnel Hill and roll up Bragg's flank and complete the victory. He had instructed Sherman to advance at first light when Thomas and his corps would attack in the centre. However Sherman did not carry Tunnel Hill. For seven hours the Federals tried to dislodge the Rebels with superior numbers of four to one, but to no avail. Sherman showed a surprising lack of imagination. He attacked Cleburne head on with only a fraction of his forces rather than look for a way to outflank the Confederates on Tunnel Hill. Fortunately, later on in the afternoon, the Federals under Thomas in the centre attacked and against all expectations reached the top of the ridge and routed the Rebels.

Again, Cleburne's division acted as the Army's rearguard during the retreat. He was again ordered to position his men in Ringgold Gap and hold it "at all costs" until the Army's wagons had gotten safely away. No sooner positioned had Cleburne his troops, when General Hooker attacked. By noon, Cleburne's men had been in action for four hours, outnumbered three to one, against a series of poorly organised attacks. At noon, came word that they could withdraw as the wagon trains were out of danger. Cleburne and his division went into winter camp between Ringgold Gap and Dalton, Georgia. On November 27, Bragg sent his resignation to President Davis who accepted it and placed Hardee in temporary command.

As for Cleburne, not only was he delighted by the change in command but he was flooded with compliments. Earlier he had been described by General R E Lee as like: "a meteor shining from a clouded sky" and President Davis christened him 'Stonewall Jackson of the West.' Perhaps it may have been more accurate to call Jackson 'Pat Cleburne of the East'?

Bragg commended him in his report to Davis and the Confederate Congress passed a resolution of thanks. One Union commander when explaining the defeat at Ringgold Gap was reported to have said Cleburne's division "was reputed as the best in Bragg's Army." Certainly at Tunnel Hill and Ringgold Gap, Cleburne earned the sobriquet that Davis had bestowed on him. His tactical command in the use of his small force and strategic use of terrain was outstanding. There was no doubt of his fitness for command of a corps.

As a mark of recognition Cleburne's division was allowed to retain their distinctive blue flag with white moon in the centre. From May 1863 all Confederate units had to use the "National Flag." In the army of Tennessee only this division was permitted to carry their old flag.

## Cleburne's Proposal to Enlist Slaves

Shortly after Christmas 1863 General Joseph Johnston assumed command of the Army with Hardee reverting to corps command. On January 2, 1864 at General Johnston's headquarters in Dalton, Georgia, a meeting was held of the high command of the Army. At the meeting Cleburne outlined his proposal that slaves be enlisted in the Confederate army in exchange for their freedom. Those present at the meeting were bitterly divided over the merits of the proposal. To Cleburne slavery was incidental to the conflict. He had no doubt that the South would willingly let slavery expire in order to ensure its own political independence. He was so wrong. Many Southerners viewed the loss of slavery as virtually synonymous with the loss of their own liberty. His misunderstanding of the South's emotional commitment to the institution marked him as an outsider. No matter how hard he tried to become fully integrated into the culture of his adopted land, he would never fully grasp the complicated role of slavery in Southern society.

General Johnston decided to table the proposal and not send it to Richmond. He ordered everyone not to discuss it beyond the room. A copy however found its way to President Davis who found the idea utterly unacceptable. On January 31, 1864, Cleburne received a letter from General Johnston advising him of the President's decision. Cleburne while disappointed accepted the verdict without rancour. Thereafter he was careful to make no further mention of his proposal in accordance with the President's decision.

It is interesting to note that none other than General R E Lee later advocated the enlistment of blacks. Furthermore, once all involved had been pledged to secrecy, the existence of Cleburne's proposal only became public in June 1888.

Cleburne's championing of the proposal probably put an end to any thoughts he may have had of further promotion. Over a period of eight months Cleburne had been passed over for the following assignments to corps command in the Army of Tennessee, viz.:

- General Breckinridge to General D H Hill's Corps;
- General J B Hood to General Breckinridge's Corps;
- General A P Stewart to General Polk's Corps on the latter's death at Pine Mountain;
- General Stephen D Lee to General Hood's Corps on his elevation to command of the Army in mid-July 1864;
- General B F Cheatham to General Hardee's Corps on the latter's transfer.

This last posting was probably the most galling to Cleburne, as Hardee had been his friend and mentor. The wisdom of these assignments was not lost on the Northern press. The *New York Herald* reflected:

*"... Cleburne was perhaps the best man in Hood's army at this time, at least possessed of more of the sterling qualities of a man and experience as a soldier."*

While Cleburne's proposal was making its way to Richmond, Hardee confided to Cleburne that he had become engaged while on duty in Alabama. He intended to travel to Mobile and marry his fiancée. He asked Cleburne to travel with him and act as his best man. Cleburne agreed at once. At the wedding on January 13, he was dazzled by the beauty and refinement of the young women in attendance, particularly the maid of honour twenty-four year old Susan Tarleton of Mobile. He was instantly and hopelessly smitten. Before he left on his return to Georgia he asked Sue to marry him. She would not give an immediate



answer but gave him permission to write to her, at the same time promising to write to him. A month after his first visit he again took leave to visit Miss Tarleton, and after his eager and relentless urging over several days she agreed to marry him.

## **Atlanta Campaign**

In early May 1864, Sherman began his offensive against Atlanta by making a probe at Mill Creek Gap and Dug Gap where Cleburne's troops faced the Federals. Within two weeks Sherman had marched his army half the distance between Chattanooga and Atlanta, outflanking Johnston's positions at Dalton and Resaca, and forcing him to retreat from his entrenched positions.

Cleburne's division fought their opponents almost daily in a series of encounters; the skirmishing between the two armies never ceased. They were not defeated and had not been driven from their positions, but nevertheless they fell back. While the conflict was going on Cleburne kept up his correspondence with his fiancée and was obviously looking forward to his future marriage.

Nevertheless the campaign resumed. At Pickett's Mill Cleburne positioned his brigades so well that when the Federals attacked, thinking that they had overlapped the enemy's flank, they encountered the veterans of Missionary Ridge and Ringgold Gap. The Confederate's line held but if the Federals had broken the line or managed to get around the flank then it was probable that the Rebels would have been routed. The fighting continued until well past sundown. At 10:00pm Granbury, one of Cleburne's brigade commanders, suggested that he should attack with his brigade and Cleburne approved.

Granbury's men charged, broke the Federals who fled the field leaving hundreds of dead and many prisoners. Pickett's Mill was another clear victory for Cleburne's Division. For the third time his men had repelled attacks by larger forces and for a third time saved the Army from potential disaster.

For the next month there were no major battles but continual skirmishing began to weaken the effectiveness of the Confederates. Again, at Kennesaw Mountain, Cleburne and Cheatham's divisions repulsed eight thousand Federal troops with great loss. Regardless of the victories at Pickett's Mill and Kennesaw Mountain, the Army of Tennessee was retreating again after Sherman had outflanked Johnston, crossing the Chattahoochee River and threatening the Confederates communications with Atlanta.

On July 17, Johnston was dismissed from command and ordered to turn the Army over to Hood. The elevation of Hood was a slap in the face to Hardee the senior corps commander. Obviously President Davis was making it clear his dissatisfaction with Cleburne's mentor. Now the fate of Atlanta was in the hands of General Hood who had been successful in his undermining of Johnston, by secretly corresponding with Richmond complaining about what he perceived was a lack of aggression by Johnston. Hood's appointment was a fateful move. For Cleburne, it would be, ultimately, a fatal one.

On July 22, there was fierce fighting at Bald Hill near Atlanta. There was no decisive outcome of the encounter but the Confederates suffered cruelly with casualties numbering between 5,500 and 8,000. Many more such battles would destroy the Army. During the engagement at Bald Hill the commander of the Federal Army of Tennessee, Major General James McPherson, was killed in front of Cleburne's division. It failed to halt or even slow Sherman's tightening noose on the city. For the balance of July and throughout August, Cleburne's men were on the move almost constantly. On August 31, the Federals repelled the Rebels' attack at Jonesboro and on the following day broke through the defences, capturing Govan and 600 of the men in his brigade. If the Federals had pressed further into

the evening they may have destroyed Cleburne's entire command, but they did not. That very night Hood ordered the evacuation of Atlanta.

In the years after the end of the War many reasons were given to explain why Cleburne was not promoted to lieutenant general and command of a corps. He was foreign born; was not a West Point graduate; participated in the opposition to Bragg and had proposed arming the slaves. Perhaps Hardee was loath to lose Cleburne as his principal subordinate. Maybe Cleburne had reached his proper rank as a major general. One is left to wonder how Cleburne was able to achieve as much as he did when serving under failures such as Bragg, Hood and, to a lesser degree, Johnston.

## Tennessee Campaign

After a period of rest the Army arrived at Palmetto on September 20. Hardee applied to the President for a transfer and left the Army on September 27. Cleburne applied to Hood for two weeks leave to return to Mobile to be married but his application was refused. The Army proceeded north to Dalton then crossed into Alabama and arrived in Florence over the Tennessee River on November 13. Here, Hood unveiled his grand scheme. He would march the Army north and retake Nashville.

After a brief skirmish at Spring Hill on November 29, the Federals at night had slipped away to Franklin. Next day Hood was furious placing blame on Cheatham and Cleburne for the debacle. At a meeting at headquarters Hood announced his decision to make an immediate frontal attack and asked for comments. General Forrest objected, saying that he did not believe that the Federal entrenchments could be taken without great loss of life. He went on further to say that the Federals could be flanked from their works without much trouble. Cheatham and Cleburne agreed but Hood had made up his mind. The assault at Franklin would be a severe lesson in what he would demand in aggressive action. It was no accident that Generals Brown and Cleburne were posted to the front rank and told to attack along the Columbia Pike, where the Federal lines were the strongest and the ground open.

As Cleburne mounted his horse Hood again repeated the stern instructions rather pointedly to him. Cleburne looked directly at Hood and in a controlled voice remarked:

*"I will either take the enemy's works or fall in the attempt."*

Cleburne rode back to his command and gave his brigade commanders their orders. General Govan saw that he was depressed. As Govan turned to leave he said:

*"Well general, there will not be many of us that will get back to Arkansas."*

Cleburne replied:

*"Well Govan, if we are to die let us die like men."*

His words were prophetic. In the charge Cleburne had two horses shot from under him. He was forty yards short of the enemy's works when a single bullet hit him in the chest and killed him instantly. After a time the Arkansas troops were waiting for Cleburne to give them the order to go over the top all at once. One veteran remembered:

*"We waited and waited and waited". "When it didn't come, I knew Pat Cleburne was dead; for if he had been living he would have given us that order."*

In the morning after the carnage of the previous day Cleburne's body was taken to Columbia where he was interred in Rose Hill cemetery. Shortly after he was reburied at Ashwood

Cemetery behind St John's Church. It was the very spot where one week earlier Pat Cleburne had spoken of the beauty of the place.

## AFTER HIS DEATH

Sue Tarleton learned of the death of her fiancée five days after the battle of Franklin. She was overwhelmed with grief and wore mourning for a year. She did marry in the autumn of 1867 but died a year later of a swelling of the brain.

In 1870, Cleburne's aide Learned Magnum, again practising law in Helena, made arrangements for the final movement of his body to that city. Generals Lucius Polk, Frank Cheatham, the former governor of Tennessee, Isham Harris and Jefferson Davis himself, walked in a public procession that accompanied Cleburne's coffin to the docks at Memphis for the trip downriver. He was re-interred in Evergreen Cemetery overlooking Helena on April 30, 1870, twenty years after he had first arrived in that small town.

In May 1891, at a dedication of a monument erected at his grave site, General George W Gordon who had fought and been captured at Franklin gave the memorial address:

*"A truer patriot or knightlier soldier never fought and never died. Valor (sic) never lost a braver son or freedom a nobler champion...He was a patriot by instinct and a soldier by nature. He loved his country, its soldiers, its banners, its battleflags, its sovereignty, its independence. For these he fought, for these he fell."*

Cleburne lived in America for fifteen years, the last four years under arms. He arrived in the country full of hope, ambition and determination endeavouring to understand the values and ideals of his adopted land. He absorbed Southern nationalism and willingly accepted the struggle for Confederate nationhood. He went to war with his friends and neighbours and joined in their outrage at the North. As a soldier he performed to the best of his ability and directed himself to the Cause without agonising too much as to its meaning. His disappointment at the failure of his proposal to arm the slaves could not diminish his loyalty to the Army and the Cause. His love of the Confederacy was real but probably his nationalism was more influenced by duty rather than ideology. He was an emotional man, no matter how much he disguised it, who felt the attraction of patriotic sentiment as well as the burden of duty. For all the above, he sought and found glory and fame on the battlefield. However, and for some reason not easy to identify, he was never completely a part of the society he struggled to defend.

General Hardee who admired Cleburne greatly probably summed up this complex man best. Cleburne, he said:

*"...was an Irishman by birth, a Southerner by adoption and residence, a lawyer by profession, a soldier in the British Army by accident, and a soldier in the Southern armies from patriotism and conviction of duty in his manhood."*



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